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Introduction 
 
Why is it that the language of English Supreme Court judgments seems to so many Dutch 
people, professionals and non-professionals alike, much more accessible than the “legalese” 
produced by their own Hoge Raad? To name just one example, the judgment by the English 
House of Lords in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson is more than eighty years old, but Lord 
Atkin’s opinion on the duty of care in tort law, with its famous Biblical metaphor “who is my 
neighbour?”, still reads like a speech from a novel or a movie. On the other hand, the Dutch 
Kelderluik  (1965) is difficult to read, with language that is often perceived as dry. A possible 
explanation could be that this is due to a difference in “literariness” between the English and 
the Dutch text. If this is true, it would follow that English Supreme Court judgments have 
more elements of literary language than Dutch ones. 
The relevance of literature for law has been acknowledged for a long time, but this 
does not apply to literary language. While “Law and Literature” is a topic taught to students 
of law, “Law as Literature”, which studies the literary elements in legal texts, does not hold 
such a privileged position. Lawyers often view the legal and the literary language as worlds 
apart, like east and west, and “never the twain shall meet”. Yet, I want to argue that legal texts 
are indeed more “literary” than is often thought.  
The research question in this thesis, whether English Supreme Court judgments are 
more “literary” than Dutch ones, and whether this applies more to older judgments than to 
more recent ones, will be answered in three chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter is a 
literature review. I will discuss features of Dutch and English legal language and briefly touch 
on the question if legal texts should be made more accessible. Next, I will talk about literary 
language and the notion of “literariness”, which may be used when comparing English and 
Dutch judgments. I will give an overview of the criteria for literariness as proposed by Carter 
and Nash in their major work Seeing Through Language (1990), and subsequently show, in a 
brief analysis of excerpts from Donoghue v Stevenson and Kelderluik, that there is no sharp 
divide between literary and non-literary texts, but that one text is higher up on a “cline of 
literariness”, as Carter and Nash phrase it, than the other. The discussion about literariness is 
linked to Aristotle’s claim that literature is “more philosophical and relevant 
(σπουδαιότερον)” than history, as history only describes how things were, and literature how 
things might have been. It is particularly in the obiter dicta of a judgment that justices 
philosophise about this “what if”, and therefore the question could be asked if obiter dicta are 
more often found in English than Dutch Supreme Court judgments, and if their language is 
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significantly different (more philosophical or literary) from that of the other parts of the 
judgment. Finally, I will discuss the differences between the Dutch and English Supreme 
Courts, and between the areas of law from which the cases for analysis will be taken: English 
tort law and the Dutch onrechtmatige daad.  
The next chapter is a description of the methodology I used, the corpus of judgments 
for analysis, and the problems and limitations. I selected ten Dutch and nine English Supreme 
Court judgments to make up the corpus for analysis. With one exception, they are arranged in 
pairs, each pair dealing with an aspect of tort law. About fifty per cent of the judgments date 
from the twenty-first century; the other half are older, but not older than fifty years. The 
analysis will focus on stylistic and rhetorical features and make use of criteria for the 
establishment of a “cline of literariness” as proposed by Carter and Nash, with short 
excursions to their theory on the language of fiction and to speech act theory. In addition, 
obiter dicta occurring in the corpus will be investigated. The results will be discussed in the 
third chapter and, if possible, scored in tables. 
Finally, I will answer the questions from this introduction by drawing conclusions 
with regard to the difference in literariness between Dutch and English judgments, and 
between older and more recent judgments. Striking or interesting findings and the 
relationships between these findings will be highlighted. My concluding paragraph will 
contain recommendations for legal writers, and for further research in this area. 
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1. Literature Review 
 
1.1: Law as literature? 
“Read the literature of human nature. The lawyers can gain many 
points by reading” (address by Frank J. Loesch, President of the 
Chicago Bar Association, at Northwestern University Law School, 
1905). 
 
“I am told at times by friends that a judicial opinion has no business to be literature”. This is 
the opening sentence of “Law and Literature”, an essay written in 1925 by Benjamin Cardozo, 
who later became a justice of the US Supreme Court. Cardozo believed that there were more 
similarities between the literary and legal style than many people, especially lawyers, cared to 
admit. Starting from the assumption that “in matters of literary style the sovereign virtue for 
the judge is clearness” (700), he summed up a number of other requirements for a good court 
opinion, all derived from the areas of rhetoric: “The opinion will need persuasive force, or the 
impressive virtue of sincerity and fire, or the mnemonic power of alliteration and antithesis, or 
the terseness and tang of the proverb and the maxim. Neglect the help of these allies, and it 
may never win its way” (701-702; note that Cardozo himself also makes good use of 
alliteration here).  
Together with John Wigmore, who published a canon of legal novels as early as 1908, 
Cardozo can be said to have been one of the forerunners of the interdisciplinary “law and 
literature” movement, which tries to bring both together. The study of law and literature 
became an academic field in the 1970s, branching in two directions. Focusing on the analysis 
of (usually well-known) works of literature and their importance for law and lawyers, “Law 
and literature” reminds lawyers that “law is both inextricably bound to the literary culture in 
which it is practiced and significantly enriched by that unavoidable bond” (Weisberg 107). 
But it also shows them that literature can make them better lawyers. “Literatuur bevrijdt van 
oogkleppen, van een strikt egocentrische rechtsinterpretatie en leidt aldus tot aanscherping 
van het rechtsgevoel”, Bart de Vos claims in his contribution to the Liber Amicorum for Hans 
Nieuwenhuis, a Dutch professor of civil law who also wrote extensively about law and 
literature (660). There are numerous publications in this field, and many universities offer 
courses on the subject. It is an elective in the second year of the Bachelor of Law course at 
Leiden University, its purpose being “to offer reflection on central concepts and principles of 
law”, which should ideally lead to “a deeper insight into the works of literature and its 
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importance for thinking about law” (https://studiegids.leidenuniv.nl/courses/show/62387/recht 
en literatuur). 
The other branch, “law as literature”, analyses legal texts “as if they were literary 
works” (Gaakeer 15). In this field we also find a special interest for legal interpretation. 
Instead of stressing the difference between law and literature, scholars focus on the things 
they claim both have in common. James Boyd White argues that reading literature and law is 
basically the same: “Like law, literature is inherently communal: one learns to read a 
particular text in part from other readers, and one helps others to read it” (415). By sharing a 
text, a reading culture is at the same time maintained and developed. And just as a literary text 
is interpreted by its readers, legal texts are interpreted by lawyers.  
Yet in practice, law and literature are considered worlds apart when it comes to legal 
and literary language. Legal language is often seen as a variety of general language, a more or 
less closed system with specific lexical, semantic and syntactic features, meant for use by 
specialists only. The nature of literary language is far more unclear, and attempts to define 
“literature” remain notoriously vague and are nearly always associated with writing: “[a] 
written work valued for superior or lasting artistic merit” (OED, s.v. “literature”), “A vague, 
all-inclusive term for … anything written, in fact, with an apparently artistic purpose, rather 
than merely to communicate information; or anything written and examined as if it had an 
artistic purpose” (Gray 163). Literary texts are defined by their language (in this context: 
style), and an analysis of a literary work often focuses on stylistic features, even though 
stylistics has often been condemned as “too ‘objective’ and run[ning] the risk of destroying 
the sensitivity of response that readers need” (Wales 279). As this response, which results 
from an affective appeal to the emotions of the reader, is considered an integral part of 
literature, “stylistics cannot tell us what literature is” (Foster, lecture December 2013). In 
contrast to legal language, with its characteristics that can be described fairly exactly, literary 
language seems to come in many varieties and degrees: “[it] can be different and yet not 
different from ‘ordinary’ or non-literary language; there is, as it were, a ‘prototype’ of literary 
language, and also numerous variants” (Wales 280). Texts are no longer seen as either 
“literary” or “non-literary”, but more often considered in terms of “more” and “less literary”. 
In the latter view, “literariness” is a matter of degree, and this suggests that it is possible to 
establish criteria for measuring this degree. As the texts for translation and analysis are 
primarily legal texts with possible literary qualities, both legal language and the notion of 
literariness will be further discussed in the next sections. 
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1.2: Legal language between precision and comprehensibility 
“I cannot conceive how any ordinary person can be expected 
to understand it” (Lord Denning, commenting on Davy v. 
Leeds Corporation, 1964). 
 
The language of lawyers is a language for a special purpose (LSP), a variety of general 
language, used by specialists, a vaktaal (Nolta 6; Rayar 64). It shares many elements with, but 
also has characteristics that are unknown to, the general language (Nolta 6-7). Jeanne Gaakeer 
calls it a scholarly language, even an artificial language. It should be approached with care, as 
many of its concepts seem familiar, but may turn out to have entirely different meanings (20). 
Florijn also claims that lawyers “speak their own language” (5), but he prefers to call this kind 
of language a register, thus linking it more to a specific rhetorical situation than to a specific 
user: “Ik zou het een register willen noemen, een taalvariant die afhangt van de sociale rol van 
de spreker op het moment van uiting en van de onmiddellijke situatie waarin de uiting 
plaatsvindt” (6). Since there are various possible legal rhetorical situations (e.g. legislation, 
contract drafting, legal advice, court rulings), one might even conclude that there are 
subdivisions and that “legal language” is in fact a collective name for a number of varieties. 
However, there are no strict boundaries between these subdivisions and several sorts of texts 
may be used in one specific rhetorical situation. Florijn (11) gives an example of legal 
proceedings, in which the summons, written pleadings, pieces of evidence and the judgment 
play a part. Nolta also perceives a subdivision, but links it to the areas of law, claiming that 
concepts in criminal law often have a meaning that is different from the same concepts in, for 
example, civil law or administrative law (7). Subdivisions are therefore problematic. 
Legal language has many elements of the general language: it is based on the same 
grammar, and its vocabulary has a large overlap with the general language. As a special 
language, it does not stand on its own either: David Crystal claims that legal language shares 
some features with other varieties of special languages, such as “a concern for coherence and 
precision”, which is also found in science, and “a respect for ritual and historical tradition”, 
which is shared with religion (347). He points out that legal language bears a grave 
responsibility towards the general public, as its statements may have a direct bearing on their 
rights and duties (ibid). The need to write (and speak) as clearly as possible has led to what 
Peter Tiersma calls a “quest for precision.” In the course of this quest, lawyers have adopted a 
legal language with many peculiarities. As a result, they are sometimes said to build “muren 
van taal” (Nolta 5) and withdraw within, using the need for precision as an excuse for 
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building them in the first place (Tiersma 70) and the need for mutual understanding between 
members of the legal profession (Nolta 9) for maintaining them. Similarly, Van Boom 
suggests that “juristen in hun eigen taalwereld leven” (49), which also conveys the idea of a 
(language) world within the world. 
Some of the building blocks in the wall of legal language indeed enhance precision. 
Among the lexical and semantic features of Dutch legal language, Foster (lecture September 
2015) and Nolta (11-12) name the use of specialist terminology, foreign words (often from 
Latin or French), and words that take on a new meaning. But others, such as archaisms, the 
omission of definite articles, the over-average use of nouns and pronouns, and a high degree 
of formality, tend to do more harm than good. Other impediments to understanding can be 
found in the area of syntax: long and complex sentences with many embedded clauses, 
indirect speech, and a preference for nominalisations and discontinuous structures. Participle 
clauses, unusual in contemporary Dutch, can still be found in Dutch legal texts. 
English legal language shares all these characteristics with Dutch, with the addition of 
some more. It seems to have a preference for conjoined words and phrases (according to 
Tiersma, this is related to lawyers’ need to anticipate every future contingency) and, in older 
texts, capitalisation of nouns. It also makes an extensive use of “implicit performatives” as do, 
may and shall (Sarcevic 137). While the English language in general has a rather strict word 
order, adverbials may appear in unusual places in legal English. Tiersma claims that even 
pronunciation and spelling may be different in legal English: “The legal profession, especially 
in England, has its own idiosyncratic way of pronouncing a few words” (51), and there are a 
few minor deviations in spelling (e.g. the omission of an e in judg(e)ment and other similar 
words). Crystal and Davy comment on the lack of punctuation that seems to be typical of 
English legal texts: “A public performance … was about the last thing likely to happen to 
those legal documents … whose chief function was to serve as written records, and hence the 
thinness of their punctuation” (200). 
Tiersma explains deviating stylistic features in legal language as resulting from the 
need of lawyers “to set themselves apart from the mass of the population and to create group 
cohesion” (51). Nolta argues that the preference for tested and tried wordings may be 
explained by a reluctance to take risks, a wish to conceal uncertainty or, less friendly, the 
desire to impress outsiders (9). Crystal and Davy also point out that legal language may have 
purposes besides communication: “Of all uses of language it is perhaps the least 
communicative, in that it is designed not so much to enlighten language-users at large as to 
allow one expert to register information for scrutiny by another” (193-194). Information is 
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therefore limited to a relatively small group of insiders: “Emphasis on group cohesion 
necessarily excludes those who do not belong” (Tiersma 69). But those who do not belong 
may be directly or personally affected by a statute, a contract, or a judgment, and are 
supposed to know the law. As the maxim says, ignorance of the law excuses no one, but to 
know a law one has to understand what it says. And understanding legal language is not easy.  
That legal language is often considered (too) complicated, especially for non-
professionals, is reflected in a number of more or less unfriendly words that are used to 
describe this type of language. The English term “legalese” has acquired connotations of 
something that is not only typical of the legal profession, but also hard to understand. The 
OED limits its meaning to the writing of lawyers: “the abstruse and complicated technical 
language of legal documents” (OED, s.v. “legalese”). Black’s definition starts rather neutral: 
“the peculiar language of lawyers,” to continue with “esp. the speech and writing of lawyers 
at their communicative worst” (Black’s, s.v. “legalese,” italics added). “Supremecourtese”, 
“gobbledygook”, and “bafflegab” are just a few of many scathing synonyms (Crystal 376). 
These invectives seem to be restricted to the English language, as there is no Dutch equivalent 
for any of them. For “legalese” the term jargon is often used, either as part of a compound: 
advocatenjargon, or together with an adjective: juridisch jargon (Van Dale, s.v. “legalese”). 
In these combinations,  jargon means voor oningewijden moeilijk verstaanbare taal, vak- of 
groepstaal (Dikke Van Dale, s.v. “jargon”), another pejorative term referring to the idea of 
lawyers living in their own language world.  
In the last decades, campaigns for a more understandable language in legal texts have 
been launched. By the end of the 1970s, a plain-English movement emerged in the United 
Kingdom. Its target was not only legal language, but all kinds of official language whose 
“legalistic” phrasing has been based on the language of statutes. The campaign met with 
opposition from the legal profession in particular. Referring to the need for precision, critics 
argued that everyday language is often ambiguous and that legal documents first and foremost 
need to be clear (although in practice, statutory provisions or judgments can also often be 
explained in more ways than one). Another argument that was brought forward was that the 
public needs to have confidence in legal texts, and that this confidence is enhanced by a 
language that has proved itself throughout the ages. Though the legal profession obviously 
feels that the need for plain English cannot be ignored altogether (which has resulted in, for 
example, the publication of drafting manuals), the Plain English Campaign still has a lot of 
work to do in the area of legal language. 
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Even though there are no legal provisions that explicitly state that judicial decisions 
have to be understandable or accessible for non-professionals (Nolta 19), there is some 
legislation in this field. For example, Article 6, paragraph 3 sub (a) of the ECHR, which states 
that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the right to be informed “in a language 
which he understands”, can be given a narrow or a wider interpretation. The first thing that 
comes to mind here is the right to an interpreter, which is stated under (e) in the same 
paragraph. However, this article could also be applied to those who speak the same language 
as the court, but do not understand it because of incomprehensible language (Nolta 19), and 
even further, as a right to understandable language when dealing with the law in general. 
Provisions with regard to the right to intelligible legal language have also been adopted in 
Dutch law. Recent laws oblige banks, insurers and civil notaries to use understandable 
language in the communication with their clients. Book 6, article 238, paragraph 2 of the 
Dutch Civil Code stipulates that “The contractual provisions of a contract … must always be 
drafted in plain, intelligible language” (http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/legislation/dcctitle 
6655.htm).  
The DCC does, of course, not tell us what kind of language may be characterized as 
“plain”, and for whom this language should be intelligible. Language trainers and bureaus try 
to provide the answers. For some, the notion of plain language is closely tied up with the 
Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR), an EU yardstick for 
measuring the language level of a person. Legal language is usually classified at C1 level, an 
advanced level that is said to be unintelligible for more than half of the adult population 
(Visser 307). Visser therefore suggests to use language at B1 level, also called Jip-en-
Janneketaal, for legal texts. This has provoked a heated debate. Although the need for 
improvement is widely acknowledged, Klaassen argues that law itself may be too complicated 
for simplification: “uitspraken hoeven niet in ‘jip-en-janneketaal’ te worden geschreven. 
Hoewel de uitspraak gericht is tot partijen, is het recht regelmatig te ingewikkeld om een 
daarop gebaseerde beslissing, althans op het niveau van de Hoge Raad, in voor partijen 
daadwerkelijk begrijpelijke bewoordingen op papier te zetten” (145). Jan Renkema, a member 
of Commissie Duidelijke Taal that aims at improving the communication between government 
and citizen, warns against too much simplification in the rewriting of legal documents, which 
could lead to non-professionals making incorrect interpretations: “de eis van juridische 
precisie blijft altijd op gespannen voet staan met de eis van ‘begrijpelijk voor iedereen’”(13). 
Renkema opts for clarification instead of simplification, recent authors reject both 
simplification and clarification altogether: “Zit er niet gewoon een limiet aan de mate van 
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begrijpelijk maken wanneer men het over het recht heeft? Juist de taal en de geleerdheid van 
zij die rechtspreken zorgen voor enige [sic!] afstand tot de burger, maar is die afstand zo erg?” 
(Nijenhuis 3). In the debate on the question whether legal language should be made 
accessible, the outcome for now seems that the prevalent opinion is that too much change may 
cause damage to the legal profession and even to the law itself. 
 
1.3: Literature and the notion of “literariness” 
“It is the impossibility of defining it in any simple way that is 
its most defining feature” (Katie Wales). 
 
Although “literature” lacks a clear definition, much has been written about what makes a text 
literature: the notion of “literariness”. This term was first coined in 1919 by the Russian 
linguist Roman Jakobson, who claimed that “the object of literary science is not literature but 
literariness, that is, what makes a given work a literary work” (http://oxfordindex.oup.com, 
s.v. “literariness”). In this view, a literary work contains a variety of observable features, 
which are for the most part “deviations from ordinary usage” (Gray 161). “Ordinary” or 
“normal” is in this context usually considered equal to “most frequent in the statistical sense” 
(Carter and Nash 3). Literary language “will therefore either involve many unexpected 
abnormal elements; or unexpectedness will result from a text being organized in such a way 
that normal usages are made to be deviant” (ibid).  
Miall and Kuiken argue that there is more to literariness than stylistics alone: 
“literariness cannot be defined simply as a characteristic set of text properties” (122). Instead, 
they propose a three-component model of literariness. Its first component is “the occurrence 
of stylistic variations that are distinctly (although not uniquely) associated with literary texts” 
(122). When these deviations from ‘normal’ language are found, they “push the relevant part 
of the text into the reader’s attention, to place it as if in the foreground of a picture” (Grey 
122, s.v “foregrounding”). The next, subsequent, components are readers’ defamiliarising 
responses to foregrounding, as the reader is thrown out of its comfort zone and forced to give 
meaning to the unfamiliar, followed by “the modification or transformation of a conventional 
feeling or concept” (Miall and Kuiken 123). Though these components do not necessarily 
have to occur together, it is the interaction between the components that may bring about a 
“consequent modification of personal meanings” (121, italics added). The second and third 
component are therefore “specific to the individual reader” (134), an individual’s subjective 
process, and this process may even be influenced by conditions outside the person of the 
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reader, for example, “what is regarded as beautiful by a culture or a society in any given 
period” (Wales 280). 
Recent research has often focused on the third component. In her study on the effects 
of literariness on empathy and reflection, Koopman argues that, although there is a long 
tradition of belief in the ethical potential of literary texts, “it is still far from clear which 
textual features for which readers lead to increased empathy or deep thoughts” (82). She 
claims that “literariness may indeed be partly responsible for empathic reactions” (91). 
Particularly foregrounding, which she regards as a defining feature of literariness, may have a 
positive effect on empathic understanding. Koopman acknowledges that her research was 
limited, as she used only one feature of literariness and only one literary text (in two 
versions). Besides, her research is firmly rooted in the tradition of early stylistics with its 
focus on literary style as a deviation from non-literary, “normal” style. 
More recently, the stress on the autonomy of literature with its dichotomy between 
literary and non-literary texts has given way to an approach in which literature is studied in 
relation to other forms of discourse. In their major work Seeing Through Language (1990), 
Carter and Nash argue that “the opposition of literary to non-literary language is an unhelpful 
one and that the notion of literary language as a yes/no category should be replaced by one 
which sees literary language as a continuum, a cline of literariness in language use with some 
uses of language being marked as more literary than others” (34, italics added). They present 
a set of criteria which can be used in determining the degree of literariness of a given text. 
Although the role of the reader is important: “one crucial determinant of a text’s literariness is 
whether the reader chooses to read it in a literary way”, the focus is on “text-intrinsic 
linguistic features” (35). Carter and Nash have found six of these features. I will discuss them 
briefly in relation to what is considered typical of legal texts. Next, the theory will be put to 
the test with two short excerpts from Supreme Court judgments. 
1. Medium Dependence. “[T]he more literary a text, the less it will be dependent for its 
reading on another medium or media” (38). This means that the text can be read 
without necessary support of images of some kind or other, or of supporting text, e.g. 
keys or lists of abbreviations. Legal texts may be called medium-dependent for relying 
on a specific, “legal” vocabulary. 
2. Re-registration (sometimes also called genre-mixing). “No single word or stylistic 
feature or register will be barred from admission to a literary context” (38). Legal 
language is explicitly mentioned, in that it is “recognized by the neat fit between 
language form and specific function” (ibid). However, this does not mean that legal 
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language never occurs in literary texts, as can be demonstrated from many novels with 
courtroom scenes. The opposite, the presence of literary elements in legal language, 
falls strictly speaking outside the “literary context”, but may be considered an example 
of genre-mixing “from the other (legal) side”. 
3. Interaction of Levels: Semantic Density. The more different linguistic levels are at 
work in a text, the more the text will be perceived as literary. Carter and Nash see 
semantic density as resulting from “an interactive patterning at the levels of syntax, 
lexis, phonology and discourse” (39). The most outstanding form of patterning is 
contrast, but patterns may also consist of forms of repetition, e.g. anaphora or 
parallelism. The interaction of levels may result in “a potential reinforcement of 
meaning” (40), leaving room for more than one possible meaning. Whether these 
multiple meanings actually materialise, is of course dependent on the reader, and 
although readers of legal texts, especially professionals, usually have the literary 
competence to discern the patterning, they may reject the idea of more than one 
meaning to a legal text, as it is diametrically opposed to the requirements of precision 
and clarity. 
4. Polysemy. Polysemy is “The capacity of words to have several separable meanings” 
(Gray 226). The reader is challenged to “perceive the implications consistently and 
intricately developing with the verbal pattern of the text”, and interpret the text on 
more than one level (Carter and Nash 48). The opposite, monosemy, seems 
characteristic of legal texts: “monosemy… is closely connected with the need to 
convey clear, retrievable and unambiguous information” (41). The latter seems fully 
applicable to legal texts. 
5. Displaced Interaction. Displaced interaction occurs when the reader has nothing else 
to do but to ‘read’ and interpret the text as he or she wishes. At first sight, this should 
be incompatible with legal texts which are certainly not meant for interpretation as the 
reader wishes. However, this does not mean that there is only one possible 
interpretation, as can be seen from Supreme Court judgments that are sometimes 
interpreted in more ways than one by lower courts. 
6. Discourse Patterning. These patterns do not occur at sentence level, but can be located 
at text level in, for example, parallel structures like cross-sentential repetition. It is 
related to the patterns that can be discerned when linguistic levels interact (see 3), but 
here they are found at a higher level. Discourse patterning mainly aims at 
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reinforcement of meaning, and may be used to persuade a reader to see the writer’s 
point of view. As such, it could be put to use in legal texts. 
Some of these features were already mentioned in earlier work by Crystal and Davy: “the 
relatively high proportion of singularity features… the variability of modality… and, most 
important of all, the possibility of introducing any kind of linguistic convention without its 
being necessarily inappropriate” (79). Wales also refers to “structural coherence or 
patterning” and “expressive and connotative qualities of meaning” as defining qualities of 
literariness (279). 
 
1.4: Carter and Nash put to the test 
“It is quite difficult to measure which text is more literary 
unless the two texts are of identical genre” (Andrew Yau-hau 
Tse). 
 
In determining if and to what extent the criteria for literariness proposed by Carter and Nash 
are applicable to legal texts, I selected two excerpts from English and Dutch Supreme Court 
(or House of Lords, as the case may be) judgments of fairly equal length. The first example is 
from Donoghue v Stevenson, a landmark case “which is now seen as the origin of the tort of 
negligence in the modern [English] law” (Cartwright 37). The House of Lords ruled that a 
manufacturer (in this case, of ginger beer) owes a duty of care to the customer (in this case 
Mrs Donoghue, who fell ill after drinking ginger beer from a bottle which contained a 
decomposed snail). The paragraph below was taken from the speech made by Lord Atkin.  
A. At present I content myself with pointing out that in English law there must be, 
and is, some general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which 
the particular cases found in the books are but instances. The liability for 
negligence, whether you style it such or treat it as in other systems as a species of 
“culpa”, is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral wrongdoing 
for which the offender must pay. But acts or omissions which any moral code 
would censure cannot in a practical world be treated so as to give right to every 
person injured by them to demand relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit 
the range of complainants and the extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to 
love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the 
lawyer’s question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must 
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee 
Wijnands 15 
 
would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The 
answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I 
am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question. 
 
1. Medium Dependence. This part of the judgment can be read without support of images 
or other texts. It is a legal text, but there are but few “legal” words. The only examples 
are negligence and injure, which also occur in ‘normal’ language but have a specific 
meaning in law, and culpa, a Latin word meaning “fault”. Non-professional readers 
will need to consult other media (e.g. a legal dictionary), but only to a minor extent. 
2. Re-registration. In this text, a Biblical command (love thy neighbour) is interpreted as 
a rule which also applies in law. Lord Atkin’s speech heavily relies on rhetoric: he 
tries to appeal to his audience by admitting that there are “general conceptions”, and 
that it is only natural (“no doubt”) that any offender must pay. This seems a captio 
benevolentiae, a way to capture the goodwill of the audience. In the next two 
sentences (“But acts … remedy”) he stresses the point that there must be limits and 
that these are determined by rules of law. Then he moves from worldly to Biblical 
laws, drawing his audience in with a question (“who is my neighbour?”), repeated 
with a slight, but important variation (“in law”). In the last sentence he invites the 
audience to think along his lines (and of course agree!) by hedging his conclusion: 
“the answer seems to be…”  
3. Interaction of Levels: Semantic Density. There is an implicit contrast between the 
Biblical neighbour and the neighbour “in law”, but also an explicit contrast in the 
antithesis general-particular. Forms of repetition are found in conjoined phrases such 
as acts or omissions, but also in alliteration: style it such, receives a restricted reply, 
avoid acts / or omissions, and assonance: range of complaints and extent of remedy. 
4. Polysemy. Neighbour can be understood in more ways than one (see also above). I 
found no other examples in this fragment. 
5. Displaced Interaction. This text could be interpreted in several ways. It may be read as 
a speech with the purpose of persuading the (predominantly non-professional) reader, 
it might even try to appeal to the standards and values of this reader. Professionals will 
read it as an example of judge-made law, and as a precedent for future cases.  
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6. Discourse Patterning. On text level, this paragraph has an A-B-A structure, with a first 
person (I) at the beginning and the end and a second person (you) in the middle 
section. 
The Dutch Kelderluik also concerns a tort case: when re-stocking a café an employee 
of Coca-Cola called Sjouwerman opens a trapdoor to a cellar. On his way to the toilet Mr 
Duchateau, a visitor of the café, falls into the cellar and breaks a leg. He brings an action 
against Coca-Cola, holding the company liable for creating a dangerous situation. The court 
of appeal holds that Coca-Cola has to pay only half of the damage caused by the accident, as 
Mr Duchateau had been careless as well. Coca-Cola then applies to the Supreme Court. The 
section below considers the second ground for cassation.  
B. [Overwegende] dat alleen in het licht van de omstandigheden van het gegeven 
geval kan worden beoordeeld of en in hoever aan iemand die een situatie in het 
leven roept welke voor anderen bij niet-inachtneming van de vereiste 
oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid gevaarlijk is, de eis kan worden gesteld, dat hij 
rekening houdt met de mogelijkheid dat die oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid niet 
zullen worden betracht en met het oog daarop bepaalde veiligheidsmaatregelen 
neemt; 
dat daarbij dient te worden gelet niet alleen op de mate van waarschijnlijkheid 
waarmee de niet-inachtneming van de vereiste oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid 
kan worden worden verwacht, maar ook op de hoegrootheid van de kans dat 
daaruit ongevallen ontstaan, op de ernst die de gevolgen daarvan kunnen hebben, 
en op de mate van bezwaarlijkheid van te nemen veiligheidsmaatregelen; 
dat in de hier gegeven situatie, waarin Sjouwerman, door in de doorgang naar het 
toilet een kelderluik te openen, voor bezoekers die aan hun omgeving niet hun 
volledige aandacht zouden besteden, een ernstig gevaar had geschapen, hetwelk 
hij, naar het Hof overwoog, met eenvoudige middelen had kunnen voorkomen, het 
Hof door Sjouwerman te verwijten dat hij met de mogelijkheid van zodanige 
onoplettendheid geen rekening heeft gehouden en heeft nagelaten met het oog 
daarop maatregelen, als door het Hof aangegeven, te treffen, de maatstaven die 
voor de beoordeling van de schuld van Sjouwerman aan het Duchateau overkomen 
ongeval moeten worden aangelegd, niet heeft miskend; 
Wijnands 17 
 
dat derhalve ook dit onderdeel ongegrond is; 
1. Medium Dependence. The dangerous situation referred to in this text is described 
(elsewhere in the judgment) in such a complicated way that photos of the interior of 
the café had to be made to elucidate the situation. In addition, the Court of Amsterdam 
even made a local inspection (descente). This text also relies heavily on a legal 
lexicon, especially nominalisations (niet-inachtneming, hoegrootheid, 
bezwaarlijkheid), and conjoined words and phrases (oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid, 
of en in hoever).  
2. Re-registration. Here is indeed “a neat fit” between the language form and the specific 
function of the text. This part of the judgment is in fact (part of) one long sentence 
with a number of considerations and a conclusion, each one beginning with dat. 
Though this Supreme Court judgment was also orally pronounced, its text seems to 
have been composed more for reading than for hearing – let alone pronouncing. 
3. Interaction of Levels: Semantic Density. There are some striking patterns of repetition: 
dat at the beginning of each consideration and the conclusion, and op in the second 
paragraph (parallelism). However, these repetitions are also part and parcel of this 
kind of judgments. 
4. Polysemy. There are no examples of polysemy. Each word in this text seems to have 
been chosen because of its unambiguous quality.  
5. Displaced Interaction. An unambiguous text should lead to a single interpretation. The 
reader of this text has no room for interpretation and can only follow the reasoning of 
the court. 
6. Discourse Patterning. The conclusion in the last line seems to have grown out of the 
three preceding paragraphs. 
A preliminary conclusion may be that text A is higher up on the cline of literariness than text 
B. However, as some points have been scored on the third and sixth criterion, text B cannot 
altogether be qualified as a non-literary text.  
 There is a significant difference between the contents of these texts. The Dutch text 
minutely describes what actually happened: Sjouwerman did not foresee that some visitors 
would not pay proper attention to the open trapdoor and therefore did not take adequate 
precautions. On the other hand, the English text leaves room for contemplation and 
philosophising on what might be: what would happen if every offender should be obliged to 
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pay damages? How far should a duty of care go? The questions in the text, a rhetorical device 
that is well-known from Plato, invite the reader to think along with the author. We can say 
that the English text is not only more literary, but also more philosophical in nature, and that 
the Dutch text is predominantly historical. This corresponds with a dichotomy that was 
already noticed by Aristotle in his Poetics. He claimed that the historian describes “the thing 
that has been” and the poet (who would nowadays be the writer of literature) “a kind of thing 
that might be”. It therefore follows for Aristotle that poetry (or literature) is more 
philosophical and more elevated (φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον) than history, since 
“poetry relates more of the universal, while history relates particulars” (http://www. 
loebclassics.com.ezproxy.leidenuniv. nl:2048/view/aristotle-poetics/1995/pb_LCL199.61. 
xml).  
The dichotomy between what has been and what might be is also manifest in the legal 
system. In both the UK and in the Netherlands, lower courts primarily deal with facts. In 
considering questions of law and interpreting the judgments of the lower courts, the highest 
courts have some room to operate on a more abstract level. A comparison between the 
Supreme Courts of the Netherlands and the UK learns that there are many similarities, but 
also many differences in the way they are organised, the way their judgments come into 
being, and the contents of these judgments. 
 
1.5: The Supreme Courts of the Netherlands and the UK compared 
“Cassatie is een Franse uitvinding. Het idee had exportwaarde 
en werd gecopieerd in Spanje, Griekenland, Portugal, Italië, 
België, Nederland – en Vietnam” (Marc Loth and Marijke 
Kooijman). 
 
The Supreme Court of the Netherlands, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, is the highest level 
of the Dutch judiciary. It hears appeals in civil and criminal cases and cases under tax law. As 
a court of cassation, “it considers only questions of law concerning the legality of proceedings 
in lower courts … It does not consider facts and appeals on facts” (Sarcevic 124). Cassation is 
only possible “if there has been a violation of the law or breach of procedure” (Foster 150). In 
general, the cassation procedure aims at enhancing and protecting the uniformity and 
evolution of the law, and at judicial protection (https://www.rechtspraak. nl/Organisatie-en-
contact/Organisatie/Hoge-Raad-der-Nederlanden).  
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Cases for the Supreme Court are usually heard by a panel of five justices, or three 
justices in minor cases. The justices are assisted by the Procurator General’s Office (parket), 
consisting of one procurator general and 25 advocate generals, who do preparatory work for 
the members of the Supreme Court by giving independent advice on how to rule in the 
cassation proceedings at hand. The Dutch term for this is conclusie nemen (delivering an 
advisory opinion). The advisory opinion is important because of its informative function: it 
explains a case from another position than the parties’. This position should be both 
independent and academic, but may also identify alternative possibilities of disposal (De 
Graaff et al. 28).  
The justices who deal with the case deliberate on the proceedings in chambers, in 
closed session. Who carries the most weight in these deliberations, who adds what to the 
original opinion, which part is amended or left out altogether remains unknown to the reader 
of the final judgment; article 7, paragraph 3 of the Judiciary Act (Wet RO) stipulates that 
everybody involved is sworn to secrecy. An essential part of this “secret of chambers” 
(geheim van de raadkamer) is that alternative ways of disposal, dissenting opinions, or 
underlying policy considerations are not included in the judgment. Alternatives are left out: 
“Er zijn boeken te vullen met gedachten, varianten en regels die de uitspraak niet hebben 
gehaald” (de Graaff et al. 59), and dissenters are met halfway by writing a ‘flat’ (smal en 
ondiep, ibid.) judgment. Currently, a lively debate on the desirability of more extensively 
stating the grounds of Supreme Court judgments is going on, its outcome yet unsure (see De 
Graaff et al., and “Mag het een overweginkje meer zijn?” in Ars Aequi, September 2016). 
Dutch Supreme Court judgments have become much shorter in the past decades. 
Nowadays, the advisory opinion is published in a separate document. The body of a judgment 
in a civil-law case is usually divided into four sections: the proceedings in the lower judicial 
authorities (whose judgments are only referred to, not included in the text), the cassation 
proceedings, the assessment of the grounds for cassation, and the decision. The language that 
is used in these judgments by the highest judicial authority often serves as an example for 
lower courts. This implies that Supreme Court judgments should always be perfectly clear to 
every professional within the judiciary. However, this is not always the case. According to 
Nolta, there is a direct relationship between the special position of the Dutch Supreme Court 
as a cassation court and its use of language: “de regel dat de Hoge Raad geen beslissing meer 
over de feiten mag nemen, is op sommige punten bepalend voor zijn taalgebruik” (46). It has 
to make an interpretation of the judgment of the lower court, and in this interpretation often 
uses words as kennelijk and klaarblijkelijk when expressing what this court must have meant 
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(46-47). It also has a preference for double negation. Wordings such as niet onbegrijpelijk or 
niet onjuist leave room for words with another purport, whereas the opposite (juist) would 
have excluded alternatives (ibid).  
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is the final court of appeal for all United 
Kingdom civil cases and criminal cases from England, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
reassessing judgments on both facts and on points of law. It was created in 2009 as the 
successor of the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords to make the highest level of the 
judiciary independent from Government and Parliament. The twelve Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary or “Law Lords”, members of the House of Lords, were transferred to the Supreme 
Court and became its first justices; the former Lord Chief Justice took on the title of President 
of the Supreme Court. Nowadays, justices are directly appointed on recommendation of a 
selection panel, to which candidates may apply. 
Appeal cases “on arguable points of law of the greatest public importance” 
(http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC) can only be brought to the Supreme Court if 
permission to appeal is obtained, either from the Court of Appeal or from the Supreme Court 
itself.  An appeal is usually heard by a panel of five justices (or more in cases of major 
importance). After the appeal hearing, for which parties have to present their documents to the 
Court, judgment is given. Each justice contributes his or her opinion to the judgment, so that 
not only the majority can present their arguments, but dissenting opinions may also be voiced. 
Judgments written by the UK Supreme Court are usually much shorter than those by 
its predecessor, the House of Lords. Justices may now indicate their agreement with another 
opinion in the heading of that opinion, rather than in the text of their own opinion. Normally, 
an UKSC judgment consists of a title page, a page with a list of counsel, the body of the 
judgment and optional appendices. The body of the judgment is made up of one or more 
opinions: one if all judges indicate agreement with this opinion, more if there are comments 
or dissenting opinions. There are no hard and fast rules for the structure of these opinions: 
“Opinions may be structured by the use of unnumbered italicized headings and sub-headings, 
but the structure of such headings is optional … and there is no common vocabulary for these 
headings such that the reader might be able to easily identify the part of the judgment which 
deals with the facts, with the judicial history of the case, and so on” (Hanretty 41). 
The Supreme Courts of the Netherlands and the UK share a number of characteristics. 
Both are the highest courts in the areas of civil and criminal law. Their decisions are binding 
on lower courts. In both Courts, cases are dealt with by a panel of justices. Access to both 
Courts is not unlimited, though the conditions for permission differ. However, there are also 
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large differences, which have a direct impact on the wording of the judgments. The justices of 
the Supreme Court of the UK all express their own opinion in the judgment. It is therefore 
clear which position a certain justice has taken on a specific case: he or she may be one of the 
majority or have a dissenting opinion. This is not at all clear in a Dutch Supreme Court 
judgment. Owing to the secret of chambers, not only the opinion of the individual justices, but 
also the authorship of judgments is always unclear (if the advisory opinion is published, it 
states the name of the advocate general or procurator general who wrote it, though).  
Under the doctrine of precedent (stare decisis), former precedents must be abided by 
when the same points arise again in litigation (Oxford Dictionary of Law, s.v. “stare decisis”). 
In English law, the ratio decidendi, the “part of a judgments that represents the legal 
reasoning” (Oxford Dictionary of Law, s.v. “precedent”), is considered binding on lower 
courts if it is directly based on the facts established at law and directly underlies the final 
decision (Zwalve 80); in Dutch law, it is more theoretical, consists of general principles and is 
not strictly binding. Both English and Dutch judgments may also contain elements which are 
not part of the ratio decidendi. These are called obiter dicta: remarks that are made “in 
passing”. They are not relevant to the decision, but lower courts may take obiter dicta into 
account when dealing with a similar case, especially when they have been laid down by the 
Supreme Court. Obiter dicta are often philosophical in nature, considering what might have 
been if the facts had been just very slightly different and sometimes even hinting at the 
possibility of a different outcome in that case. Of the 471 cases in the UKSC database, 
consulted on 15 October 2016, 183 instances of the word obiter were found, which is about 
18.68 per cent of all cases. Obiter dicta seem relatively rare in Dutch judgments. A search on 
rechtspraak.nl on 15 October 2016 yields 183 instances of obiter, about 0.38 per cent of the 
48,713 Supreme Court cases in the database at that time. From this, it should not be concluded 
that English judgments are more philosophical than Dutch ones, as an obiter dictum may be 
included in the text without explicitly being named so (see, for example, the case of the 
Meppelse ree (ECLI:NL:HR:1983: AG4688), in which obiter was said that “hoezeer zijn 
reactie op de plotselinge kritieke situatie menselijkerwijs ook begrijpelijk moge zijn”, the 
driver who tried to avoid a collision with a deer by swerving to the left side of the road, with 
fatal consequences, could nevertheless be blamed). Dissenting opinions in English Supreme 
Court judgments are also obiter dicta. Though not binding, they are considered very important 
for the development of law, as yesterday’s dissenting opinions might well be tomorrow’s 
leading opinions (Zwalve 80). 
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1.6: Onrechtmatige daad and Tort 
“[T]his is an area of the law in which, as Lord Nicholls said, 
imprecision is inevitable. To search for certainty and precision 
… is to undertake a quest for a chimaera” (Lord Dyson in 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets). 
 
The research part of my thesis consists of an analysis of a corpus of civil law cases brought 
before the Dutch Supreme Court, the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden, and the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom (and its predecessor, the House of Lords). The Dutch cases all deal with 
the onrechtmatige daad (law of tort), defined in Book 6, article 162, paragraph 1 of the Dutch 
Civil Code: “Hij die jegens een ander een onrechtmatige daad pleegt welke aan hem kan 
worden toegerekend, is verplicht de schade die de ander dientengevolge lijdt, te vergoeden” 
(A person who commits an unlawful act against another person that can be imputed to him, 
must repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result of this act). In Dutch 
law, onrechtmatige daad is defined by five elements: 
1. There has to be an unlawful act, defined in Book 6, article 162, paragraph 2 of the 
DCC as “a violation of someone else’s right (entitlement) and an act or omission in 
violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to unwritten law has to be 
regarded as proper social conduct, always as far as there was no justification for 
this behaviour” (www.dutchcivillaw.com). The Dutch text of this paragraph, “een 
doen of nalaten in strijd met … hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt” is often interpreted as a breach of a “standard of 
care” (schending van een zorgvuldigheidsnorm, Loonstra 130) and may in this 
respect have some connection with the duty of care which is the focal point in the 
English tort of negligence. 
2. There has to be damage. This can be damage to property, harm to persons 
(resulting in suffering, injury or even death), or pure economic loss. 
3. There has to be causation: a “relationship between the act and the consequences it 
produces” (Oxford Dictionary of Law, s.v. “causation”). In other words, the act 
must be the condicio [sic] sine qua non for the damage (Nieuwenhuis 41). In 
English law, this is also known as the “but-for test”: “but for the tortfeasor’s action 
the damage would never have occurred” (Foster, lecture February 2016). The 
important questions here are if and to what extent the tortfeasor’s behaviour has 
contributed to the damage. The “if” question is asked to establish liability. The 
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answer to the second question, to what extent someone is liable, determines the 
amount of damages.  
4. The act can be imputed to its author “if it results from his fault or from a cause for 
which he is answerable according to law or the generally accepted view” (Foster 
17, translation of Book 6, article 162, paragraph 3 of the DCC), this is called 
imputability.  
These four elements all have to be present to bring an action for onrechtmatige daad. Of 
course, one element may carry more weight than another, but they all have to be there in some 
degree.  
5. The protective norm criterion (Foster 19) which is set out in Book 6, article 163 of 
the DCC states that “There is no obligation to repair the damage on the ground of a 
tortious act if the violated standard of behaviour does not intend to offer protection 
against damage as suffered by the injured person” (www.dutchcivillaw.com).  
This fifth requirement has to be met in order to qualify for damages.  
 
Onrechtmatige daad is usually translated into English with “unlawful act” (Van den 
End, Foster). “Tort”, which is often thought to be the most likely English counterpart, has 
different connotations, as the Dutch and the English legal systems are different too. In the 
Netherlands, onrechtmatige daad is a single concept for all kinds of unlawful acts. Any 
translation of Dutch law in this area would therefore have to be in the singular form: the law 
of tort. English tort law may be singular or plural: there are two different schools of thought. 
The oldest view is that there is a law of torts, “only specific torts and unless the damage 
suffered can be brought under a known or recognised head of liability, there should be no 
remedy” (Keenan 431). In this view, it would be impossible to establish new torts (as Keenan 
claims). Some writers (Weir, Zwalve) argue that recent developments (e.g. the development 
of the tort of negligence) indicate that there is a law of tort, “that all harm should be 
actionable in the absence of a just cause or excuse” and that “under the flexibility of case law 
new torts have come into being” (ibid., italics added). The structure of English tort law may 
be compared to criminal law, rather than (Dutch) civil law: “Tort is more like criminal law, 
for just as there are different crimes…so there are different torts… so to get to know the law 
of tort one must get to know the different requirements of the various torts, and there are quite 
a lot of them” (Weir 11; see also Zwalve 418).  
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Whatever the tort may be, the focal points are always the same and are to a large 
extent similar to the Dutch requirements. English tort cases are always about: 
1. what the alleged tortfeasor did (the unlawful act, the cause),  
2. what the claimant suffered in consequence (damage, the effect),  
3. and the relation between these two facts (causation).  
Imputability is not a general criterion for tort in English law, though Weir considers an 
“assumption of responsibility” that can be imputed to a defendant a key feature in cases of 
negligence resulting in economic loss (35). Neither is the protective norm criterion. There is, 
however, a connection between Dutch and English law here: the Dutch protective norm (or 
Schutznorm, see Nieuwenhuis 18) theory is a defence that can also be invoked in the English 
tort of breach of statutory duty. In Gorris v Scott (1874), the claimant could not recover under 
breach of statutory duty, because the statutory provisions he relied on had the purpose of 
preventing the spread of disease on a ship carrying sheep, and not of preventing sheep from 
falling overboard (Keenan 817). Nieuwenhuis claims that this English tort case “inspired” 
Book 6, article 163 of the DCC (18-19). 
English torts must be specifically known (hence the term “nominate” torts), and each 
tort has its own rules and remedies. Some of the oldest nominate torts are trespass (to land, to 
goods or to the person), nuisance (public or private), and conversion (“what the defendant in a 
typical conversion case has done is to sell or buy a thing belonging to the claimant” (Weir 
154)). Other important torts are defamation, discrimination and economic torts (a.o. malicious 
falsehood, intimidation and conspiracy). Negligence, as early as 1856 defined as “the 
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a 
prudent and reasonable man would not do” (Baron Alderson in Blyth v Birmingham 
Waterworks), has become the most important tort. First only regarded as a component of 
other, more specific, torts, negligence developed into a separate tort in the nineteenth century. 
According to Weir, the tort of negligence differs from other torts in that it is not about 
liability, but about a legal duty of care (29, italics added). Consequently, there must be a 
breach of this duty of care, damage and causation. In order for a duty of care to arise in 
negligence, three criteria must be met: 
1.  harm must be reasonably foreseeable as a result of the alleged tortfeasor's 
conduct; 
2. the parties must be in a relationship of proximity;  
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3. it must be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty. 
English tort law proceeds the way of all common law: it is developed by judges on a 
case-by-case basis. However, sometimes the legislature intervenes. For example, the torts of 
trespass to goods, detinue (wrongful detention of goods) and conversion overlapped and were 
considered complex and archaic. The Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977 abolished the 
tort of detinue and simplified the law and the procedure (Barker 214). Though the courts are 
bound by statute, this is not considered an obstacle to an ongoing development of the common 
law. “The common law is constantly developing … It is quite possible that a later 
development in the common law will take away the case for a reform which has been enacted 
on the basis of what the law was previously thought to be … But that will not deter the courts 
from developing the law unless it is clearly inconsistent with what Parliament has enacted” 
(Lady Hale in Douglas v Hello! Ltd., 315). If Keenan is right in claiming that, so far, the 
courts have not managed to create new torts (invasion of privacy, mentioned by Weir as an 
example of an “emergent” tort, can also be considered in the light of article 8 of the Human 
Rights Act 1998), they have certainly extended the old ones (432). Especially the scope of 
liability in the tort of negligence has ever been expanded and refined, a development already 
foreseen in 1932, when Lord MacMillan said in Donoghue v Stevenson that “the categories of 
negligence are never closed”. 
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2. Methods, Materials and Limitations 
 
2.1: Methodology 
“You know my methods. Apply them.” (Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle). 
 
The Dutch and English Supreme Court judgments that make up the corpus for analysis were 
all taken from electronic databases: Legal Intelligence or Rechtspraak for the Netherlands, 
Bailii for the UK. The criteria for selection and the focal points of each case can be found in 
2.2. I copied each judgment to a separate MS Word document, as this type of document is 
suitable for electronic processing. Word counts and searches could thus be quickly done. To 
avoid extreme differences in length, only the leading speeches of English judgments were 
selected for analysis (the rest was deleted from the document). The preliminary proceedings 
and the advisory opinion that used to be an integral part of older Dutch Supreme Court 
judgments were not included in the material for analysis either. 
In an analysis of the corpus I tried to establish any presence of the six criteria for 
literariness defined by Carter and Nash (see 1.3). First, I closely read the definition proposed 
by Carter and Nash and then asked myself how this was likely to manifest in Supreme Court 
judgments. I soon found that these definitions, though valuable, are hardly applicable to texts 
that are first and foremost legal texts, when interpretation is limited to the narrow sense that 
they have been given in Seeing Through Language. I therefore decided to give some of them a 
broader interpretation. Thus the central question for establishing medium dependence became: 
“is there anything (else) from outside the text that a non-professional reader would need for a 
full comprehension of this text?” Carter and Nash explicitly name visual media and codes or 
keys to abbreviations (38), but I tried to make the definition as broad as possible by 
considering other possibilities (e.g. legal dictionaries) as well. In addition, I included in the 
discussion of re-registration two “games” that are characteristic of fiction: the realism game 
and the keynote game (Carter and Nash 99-106), and linked the criterion of displaced 
interaction, with its focus on the interaction between writer and reader, to speech act theory. I 
closely observed the wordings in each judgment and marked with a comment each word, 
phrase or sentence that I felt to be exemplary. By using the search function I was able to count 
the number of instances of a specific criterion in each text and to highlight striking examples. 
Finally, I also looked at obiter dicta as potential examples of a more philosophical (or even 
literary) approach of the case. I first looked for parts of the judgments that could be identified 
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as obiter and then searched for evidence of literariness, applying the same method as 
described above. 
For each criterion, I visualised, if possible, the results in a table (or more than one 
table if necessary for reasons of readability). Each table is divided into a Dutch and an English 
part; the Dutch judgments are on the left side, with odd case numbers, and the English 
judgments are on the right, with even case numbers. Within each half, the judgments are also 
ranked in chronological order (from 1965 to 2016). This makes it easy to see if a specific 
phenomenon occurs more often in Dutch or English judgements, and more often in older or in 
more recent judgments.  
 
2.2: Materials and Limitations: the corpus for analysis 
“There would be much to be said for our adopting the practice 
of other supreme courts in having a single majority opinion to 
which all have contributed and all can subscribe without 
further qualification or explanation. There would be less grist 
to the advocates' and academics' mills, but future litigants 
might thank us for that” (Lady Hale in Douglas v Hello! Ltd). 
 
I selected the materials for analysis from the extensive online collections of Dutch and 
English Supreme Court (or House of Lords) judgments, according to the following criteria: 
- With one exception, the corpus is made up of pairs: one Dutch and one English 
judgment, both focusing on the same aspect of onrechtmatige daad or tort (though 
there are, of course, more criteria than one involved in all these cases). Overall, the 
corpus covers the three focal points that Dutch and English tort law have in common 
(unlawful act, damage and causation), and the three requirements for a duty of care in 
the tort of negligence (foreseeability, proximity, and that it must be fair, just and 
reasonable to impose a duty of care, see also 1.6). 
- Ideally, both judgments of a pair date from (about) the same time and are of fairly 
equal length (in practice, English judgments are often, but not always, longer). On 
average, the judgments in the corpus have about 3,750 words. 
- The judgments cover a period of about fifty years: the oldest English judgment dates 
from 1965, the most recent one was delivered in 2016. Approximately half of them 
date from the twentieth century, the other half from the twenty-first. The same goes 
for the Dutch judgments (also dating from 1965 to 2016). Older well-known cases 
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were easy to find. Unfortunately this does not apply to other, less well-known cases 
from before 1990: so far, only few have been digitised. The major part of the corpus 
therefore consists of cases from (roughly) the last two decades of the twentieth and the 
first decades of the twenty-first century. 
- Only one English judgment was delivered by the UK Supreme Court, the other eight 
cases were dealt with by its predecessor, the House of Lords. It was difficult to find 
suitable material from the Supreme Court, as the number of tort cases dating from 
2010 or later is restricted. Moreover, there is a problem with the word count. It is true 
that the UK Supreme Court tends to deliver judgments that are shorter, as judges may 
now agree with the leading opinion without having to make a speech of their own (see 
also 1.5), but this is the overall length: as a result of the new procedure, the leading 
opinion has to include (almost) everything that is relevant to the case and thus 
becomes longer.  
- The authorship of Dutch Supreme Court judgments is never clear (see 1.5). It is 
therefore impossible to know who actually wrote what, and it is possible that more 
than one judgment has been written by the same justice. On the other hand, I made 
sure that the leading speeches of House of Lords judgments have all been written by 
different justices, as having two or more speeches by the same author would severely 
upset the balance in the corpus. These speeches are from Lord Justices only. Lady 
Justices are few in number: so far, Lady Hale is the only woman to have been 
appointed to the English Supreme Court. Besides, I selected the cases on the basis of 
their characteristics, not on the basis of the sex of the justice. 
The corpus for analysis is made up of the following judgments: 
Kelderluik (1965) has become the standard for Dutch cases pertaining to the duty of 
care. Four criteria which have to be taken into account when creating a dangerous situation 
(gevaarzetting) were first defined in this case. These criteria have often been referred to in 
later cases. Jetblast (2004, not included in this corpus) and Nijmeegse Markt (2016) show 
how important the Kelderluik criteria still are. Because of its recent date, Nijmeegse Markt has 
been included into the corpus. Haley v London Electricity Board (1965) is in many ways 
comparable to Kelderluik. All three cases focus on the foreseeability of the harm, though the 
outcome differs.  
For a duty of care to arise in negligence, there must be a relationship of proximity 
between the parties. The limits of proximity are especially explored in nervous shock cases. 
Wijnands 29 
 
England has a long tradition in this area, from Dulieu v White & Sons (1901) to White v the 
Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police (1999, both not included in this corpus). The 
claimant in McLoughlin v O'Brian (1983) is a woman who did not witness the accident in 
which one of her children was killed, but came on the scene in its immediate aftermath. The 
same goes for the Dutch Taxibus (2002). The focus in the next pair, Taxusstruik (1994) and 
Page v Smith (1995), is on the question if the harm was foreseeable as a result of the (alleged) 
tortfeasor’s conduct and on the question how fair, just and reasonable it is to impose a duty of 
care in these cases. 
Another important aspect of tort is causation. There has to be a direct relationship 
between the (unlawful) act and the damage, even if this damage is related to a physical or 
psychological predisposition that is typical of the victim. The principle that “the tortfeasor 
takes his victim as he finds him” does not only apply to the so-called “thin skull” or 
eierschedel cases, but also to Renteneurose (1985) and Simmons v British Steel (2004). If an 
act (or an omission) can be imputed to a doctor, the major question is one of damages: which 
damages can be considered “fair, just and reasonable”? In so-called “wrongful birth” cases, 
such as the Dutch Wrongful Birth (1997) and McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (1999), both 
statute law (contract law) and common law (tort law) may play a part. 
Employers are liable for wrongful acts committed by their employees, but where does 
this liability end? The limits of vicarious liability, together with the question if it is fair, just 
and reasonable to hold an employer liable for the wrongful acts of his employees, are 
explored in Kievitsdal (2007) and, very recently, in Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets 
Plc (2016). 
Although the tort of negligence sometimes seems to be “dominant and pervasive” 
(Weir 29), there are other tort categories in this corpus too. They range from the tort of 
(private) nuisance and the question if an unlawful act has been committed in Burengeschil 
(2005) and Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997), to the tort of defamation and the question of 
damages in Sanoma v Boerhaave (2006) and Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers (2002). 
The corpus has been completed with two cases concerning invasion of privacy, regarded by 
Weir as an “emerging” tort (169): both Cruijff v Tirion Uitgevers (2013) and Douglas v 
Hello! Ltd (2007) particularly discuss the kind of damage that has been done. 
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The final selection is thus as follows: 
 
1a. Kelderluik (1966): negligence/duty of care/foreseeability 
1b. Nijmeegse markt (2016): negligence/duty of care/foreseeability 
2. Haley v London Electricity Board (1965, leading speech by Lord Reid): negligence/duty of 
care/foreseeability 
3. Taxibus (2002): negligence/nervous shock/proximity 
4. McLoughlin v O'Brian (1983, leading speech by Lord Wilberforce): negligence/nervous 
shock/proximity 
5. Taxusstruik (1994): negligence/foreseeability/fair, just and reasonable 
6. Page v Smith (1995, leading speech by Lord Keith): negligence/foreseeability/fair, just and 
reasonable 
7. Renteneurose (1985): negligence/causation/the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him 
8. Simmons v British Steel (2004, leading speech by Lord Hope): negligence/causation/the 
tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him 
9. Wrongful Birth (1997): negligence/imputation/damages 
10. McFarlane v Tayside Health Board (1999, leading speech by Lord Slynn): 
negligence/imputation/damages 
11. Kievitsdal (2007): negligence/vicarious liability employer/fair, just and reasonable 
12. Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets Plc. (2016, leading speech by Lord Toulson): 
negligence/vicarious liability employer/fair, just and reasonable 
13. Burengeschil (2005): private nuisance/unlawful act 
14. Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd (1997, leading speech by Lord Goff): private 
nuisance/unlawful act 
15. Sanoma v Boerhaave (2006): defamation/unlawful act/damages 
16. Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd. (2002, leading speech by Lord Bingham): 
defamation/unlawful act/damages 
17. Cruijff v Tirion Uitgevers (2013): invasion of privacy/damage 
18. Douglas v Hello! Ltd (2007, leading speech Lord Hoffmann): invasion of privacy/damage 
 
(see Appendix A for a list of these cases and their sources in chronological order). 
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3. Results 
 
3.1: Medium Dependence 
 
The first of the six criteria for literariness defined by Carter and Nash is medium 
dependence: the impossibility to read a specific text without the support of images or other 
sorts of texts or specific vocabulary. The question that should be asked here is whether there 
is anything from outside the text that a non-legal reader would need for a full comprehension 
of this text. I looked for the presence of visual support, legal abbreviations, legal Latin, and 
legal terminology. If possible, I processed the results in a table. The cases in this table are 
divided into a Dutch (odd case numbers) and an English part (even case numbers); both parts 
are ranked in chronological order. 
a. Visual support. For the sake of clarity, the place where the wrongful act was committed is 
often minutely described. Sometimes this description indeed helps to clarify the situation. 
However, in the only instance of visual support that I found, it creates confusion: in 
Kelderluik, descriptions of the actual situation are mixed with descriptions of how this 
situation would have been if adequate precautions had been taken. The reader does not 
have the benefit of inspecting the site (which was done by the court) or of the 
photographs made for use in the proceedings. 
b. Legal abbreviations. As can be seen from table 1, Dutch judgments make an extensive 
use of legal abbreviations, for referring to parties to the proceedings (pp., adv., dagv.), 
legal grounds (rechtsoverwegingen: r.o. and rov.), and legislation (particularly the Dutch 
Civil Code, BW, and the Code of Civil Procedure, Rv.).  
Table 1 
Legal abbreviations 
case nr.   1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year  66 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
pp.  1 2 
       
    
       
  
adv.  2 
        
    
       
  
O.  2 
        
    
       
  
dagv.  9 
        
    
       
  
Rb.  4 
        
    
       
  
rov.    4 
 
3 
     
    
       
  
r.o.    
   
18 4 6 
 
7 12   
       
  
art(t).  2 
        
    
       
  
Gw  1 
        
    
       
  
RO  1                 1                   
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case nr.   1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
BW  1 
 
4 3 6 2 2 6 4 13   
       
  
Rv.  3 
  
1 1 
    
    
       
  
WRO    
    
4 
   
    
       
  
Aw.    
       
1     
       
  
L.J.    
        
  1 10 3 2 
    
  
J.    
        
    6 5 2 
    
  
QC    
        
    
    
2 2 2 1 
CPR                                1       
 
Kelderluik (nr. 1a) seems to rely more on knowledge of legal abbreviations than more 
recent Dutch judgments. English judgments have fewer abbreviations: legislation is written 
out in full, nearly all abbreviations refer to titles of judges and justices (L.J., J., QC; the 
only exception is CPR, Civil Procedure Rules); in addition, abbreviations are mainly found 
in older judgments. 
c. Legal Latin. Legal Latin is very rare in Dutch judgments. More than half of the eight 
instances are found in Kelderluik. It is not found in recent judgments, as the Dutch 
Supreme Court has abolished the practice of using Latin terms in its judgments (Feteris 
3247). However, legal Latin is very frequently used in English judgments, to this very day. 
The reason for this is the fact that Latin managed to keep its privileged position as the 
language of English law for a long time. Moreover, judges may adopt the wordings of the 
ratio of previous cases. There is one word that occurs in both languages: dictum, the 
“operative part of the judgment” (Van den End, s.v. “dictum”). I also found one instance of 
legal French: descente (in case nr. 13: Burengeschil). 
Table 2 
Legal Latin 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 66 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
posita 1 
         
  
      
   
probandum 4 
         
  
      
   
de facto   1 
        
  
      
   
pro se    
      
2 
  
  
      
   
dictum             1                         
ratio                     1                 
ex tempore   
         
1 
      
   
prima facie   
         
  1 
     
   
genus   
         
  
 
1 
    
   
ex post facto   
         
  
 
2 
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case nr. 1a 1b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
solatium   
         
  
   
1 
 
1 
 
  
dictum   
         
  
     
3 
 
  
nexus   
         
  
     
1 
 
  
de minimis non curat lex   
         
  
     
1 
 
  
injuria   
         
  
   
2 
 
    
damnum   
         
  
   
3 
 
    
qui facit per alium facit per 
se   
         
  
      
 
1 
respondeat superior   
         
  
      
 
1 
gravamen   
         
  
  
1 
   
   
ex parte   
         
  
      
1   
novus actus interveniens   
         
  
   
2 
  
   
quantum                               1       
 
d.  Legal terminology. Dutch judgments rely to some extent on legal terminology. There even 
seems to be a trend towards using more legal terms in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (see Table 3). On the other hand, English legal terminology is rare. Apart from the 
usual terms as appellant (also plaintiff, pursuer or claimant) and respondent, there is but 
one example: exemplary damages, which are awarded not as a compensation, but “to 
punish the defendant, and to deter him and other from similar behaviour in the future” 
(Keenan 460).  
Table 3 
Legal terminology 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
 
                                      
exploit   
 
1 
      
  
        
  
exploot   
   
1 1 
   
  
        
  
uitvoerbaar bij voorraad   
   
1 1 2 
  
  
        
  
ten titel van   
   
1 
    
  
        
  
interlocutoir vonnis   
        
  
        
  
comparitie   
 
1 
  
1 
 
2 
 
  
        
  
geintimeerde   
        
  
        
  
onder algemene titel   
  
1 
     
  
        
  
in vrijwaring   
      
5 
 
  
        
  
gevoegd   
      
2 
 
  
        
  
nemen van een conclusie   
      
1 
 
  
        
  
betekening   
    
3 2 
  
  
        
  
bodemprocedure   
     
1 
 
1   
        
  
verbeurte van een dwangsom   
        
  
        
  
exemplary damages                               1       
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3.2: Re-registration and fictitiousness 
 
In the light of what was discussed in 1.3, re-registration may be defined here in a more 
general way, i.e. as the process of admitting elements from other registers (or genres) to a text 
that is itself marked as belonging to a specific genre. In this case, I will be looking for the 
presence of non-legal language in a legal text. According to the nature of the case, medical 
(e.g. scapulae, pneumoconiosis) or technical (e.g. burner, stanchion) terminology may be 
found, though in English cases only (nrs. 4, 6, 8 and 10). Unlike medium dependence, which 
can be established by “filtering out” single words, re-registration is mainly about phrases, 
sentences or even longer elements of the texts. Some of my findings can be accounted for by 
the differences between English and Dutch Supreme Court judgments: the former consist of 
personal opinions, whereas the latter are the result of a co-production. As a consequence, the 
first person singular may be used (apart from the last line, in which the justice has to indicate 
if he will allow or dismiss the appeal and then always speaks in the first person): 
- “I find myself to be in agreement…” (14.) 
The justice may address the other Lords in his speech (if it is delivered in public): 
- “My Lords, I regard this contention as misconceived” (16.), 
but also the audience in court. He may take his audience by the hand: 
- “we must then consider…” (4.), 
- “let me just expand a little further…” (16.), 
or even directly appeal to the audience, inviting them to think along his lines: 
- “Can it make any difference that…?” (4.), 
- “Is there any conceptual problem about the fact that…?” (18.), 
or he may voice a personal opinion or interpretation (which occurred in all English 
judgments): 
- “I think what they did was quite insufficient” (2.), 
- “And it surely cannot be right that…” (8.), 
- “There would be something wrong with the law if…” (12.). 
So far, these features are exclusively found in English judgments. However, other forms of re-
registration are shared by English and Dutch justices alike. Both may use striking words or 
expressions that belong to another (more informal or colloquial) register: 
- “met zijn gezondheid heeft gesukkeld…” (7.), 
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- “the wear and tear on the mother” (10.), 
- “juinden elkaar op…” (11.), 
and they share a preference for statements expressing common knowledge: 
- “Ieder kind wordt van jongs af aan gewaarschuwd om bijvoorbeeld geen besjes 
van planten en struiken te eten, omdat deze giftig kunnen zijn, met alle kwalijke 
gevolgen van dien” (5.), 
- “Het is immers bekend … dat paarden grazers zijn en zich dus voeden met onder 
andere planten, takken en blaadjes” (5.), 
- “As everyone knows, the personality and demeanour of witnesses … plays a large 
part in an assessment of their reliability” (8.), 
- “It is a matter of universally-shared emotion and sentiment that the intangible but 
all-important, incalculable but invaluable 'benefits' of parenthood far outweigh any 
of the mere monetary burdens involved” (10.). 
Sometimes, a quotation from a literary work is smuggled in. I found one example of a 
non-legal quotation, from a recent (2016) English judgment: “As Immanuel Kant wrote, ‘Out 
of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made’”.  
 
Table 4 
Re-registration 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
the text is clearly 
meant to be spoken: 
use of the first person 
singular, address to 
an audience                     1 1   1   2   3 1 
inviting the audience 
to think along the 
speaker's line 
         
  2 3 
  
1 
  
3   
giving a personal (but 
not a legal) opinion 
or interpretation 
         
  1 5 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
using striking words 
or expressions 
 
1 
    
2 1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 1 1 
  
  
referring to common 
knowledge or opinion 
  
2 
      
  2 1 
 
2 1 1 1 1   
non-legal quotation 
         
  
        
1 
creating suspense 
         
  1 
    
4 
  
  
lively description of a 
situation                                1     1 
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One of the resources of language that may also be used in the process of re-registration 
is the language of popular fiction. Carter and Nash distinguish two types of “games” that 
authors of fiction play to draw their audiences in. The “realism game” (99) has a preference 
for names, epithets, periphrases and statistics. The “keynote game” (104) makes use of verbs, 
adjectives, participle clauses and figurative language that all suggest intense emotion and 
action. Although this seems at first sight incompatible with legal judgments, it might be 
argued that the facts of a case are some kind of a story, and that there may indeed be elements 
in it that belong to either of these games. However, the purposes of both games should also be 
considered. A judgment has to present readers with “the facts as ascertained by law” (de in 
rechte vastgestelde feiten, Zwalve 79), and not with “the material credentials of fantasy” 
(Carter and Nash 104), which is the intention of the realism game. Therefore, these “stories” 
are real instead of realistic and the realism game does not apply. The keynote game, which 
aims at “express[ing] or stimulat[ing] appropriate states of feeling” (ibid.), seems more 
promising. I found some examples in the corpus, in English judgments only. A justice may 
create suspense: 
- “what the men did was…” (2.), 
- “his difficulties do not end even there…” (16.),  
or give a lively description of an event: 
- “Mr Khan again punched him in the head, knocked him to the floor and subjected 
him to a serious attack, involving punches and kicks, while the claimant lay curled 
up on the petrol station forecourt, trying to protect his head from the blows” (12). 
This description indeed suggests violent action, created by verbs (punched, knocked, curled 
up), an adjective (serious) and participle clauses (involving, trying), and there is even a touch 
of “realism” in the exact location: the forecourt of the petrol station. It is the best example of 
what may be called “fictitiousness” in an English judgment (though the word “claimant” may 
dispel any illusion of fiction). Another example only seems to be fictitious: 
She was taken down a corridor and through a window she saw Kathleen, crying, 
with her face cut and begrimed with dirt and oil. She could hear George shouting 
and screaming. She was taken to her husband who was sitting with his head in his 
hands. His shirt was hanging off him and he was covered in mud and oil. He saw 
the appellant and started sobbing (4, italics added). 
At first sight, the keynote game is at work here. No detail has been spared to install in the 
reader an overwhelming sense of horror and compassion. However, these sentences serve 
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quite another purpose. At the end of his speech, Lord Wilberforce refers back to this 
description to argue that the case falls within the boundaries of proximity: “Can it make any 
difference that she comes upon them … in a nearby hospital, when, as the evidence shows, 
they were in the same condition, covered with oil and mud, and distraught with pain?” 
Obviously, the first description serves as evidence and can therefore only be read as fact, not 
as fiction. 
 
3.3: Interaction of levels: semantic density 
 
According to Carter and Nash, “semantic density which … results from an interactive 
patterning at the levels of syntax, lexis, phonology and discourse” is “one of the most 
important of defining criterial categories” (39). These patterns are often made up of 
contrasting words of Anglo-Saxon or Latin derivation, monosyllabic or polysyllabic, formal 
or informal words, simple versus complex syntax, semantic oppositions and contrasting sound 
patterns. Other elements of these patterns may be forms of repetition, e.g. lexical repetition, 
alliteration, and parallelism. However, for a text to possess some degree of literariness there 
should always be some form of interaction between elements within a given pattern.  
A search for separate elements may yield some results, but in this context it is only the 
first step and the results are limited. There are no substantial syntactic contrasts in the 
judgments that make up the corpus, at least, not at sentence or paragraph level. Facts and 
events are usually described in short sentences, both in English and in Dutch judgments. The 
legal grounds are often phrased in (very) long, complex sentences with a lot of formulas, 
especially in Dutch judgments. Some paragraphs only seem to have syntactical contrast:  
There she saw Michael, who told her that Gillian was dead. She was taken down a 
corridor and through a window she saw Kathleen, crying, with her face cut and 
begrimed with dirt and oil. She could hear George shouting and screaming. 
She was taken to her husband who was sitting with his head in his hands. His shirt was 
hanging off him and he was covered in mud and oil. He saw the appellant and started 
sobbing. The appellant was then taken to see George. The whole of his left face and 
left side was covered. He appeared to recognise the appellant and then lapsed into 
unconsciousness. Finally, the appellant was taken to Kathleen who by now had been 
cleaned up. The child was too upset to speak and simply clung to her mother. There 
can be no doubt that these circumstances, witnessed by the appellant, were 
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distressing in the extreme and were capable of producing an effect going 
well beyond that of grief and sorrow (4, italics added). 
There are eleven short sentences, mostly with coordinating conjunctions and only two 
instances of subordination (“who…”). The twelfth and final sentence, the focal point or 
conclusion, is longer, but not syntactically more complicated. 
 In the area of lexis, there are several instances of contrast between words of Latin and 
Germanic derivation with the same meaning, e.g. fysiek – lichamelijk, deponeren – 
neerleggen, trust – confidence, negligence – inadvertence (Anglo-Norman vs. Latin). Other 
contrasts are more complex: 
-  “ex tempore after inadequate argument or given after full argument and mature 
consideration” (2.).  
Not only is there a contrast between words of Latin and French derivation, but there is also a 
semantic opposition: an ex tempore decision is delivered immediately after hearing and 
therefore does not involve extensive (or mature) consideration, and inadequate argument is 
certainly less than full argument. In addition, there is a rhetorical touch: the elements in the 
first phrase are reversed in the second, so that the two phrases form a chiasmus.  
 Little can be said about patterns involving informal and formal words: they are few 
and far between. Informal language seems to occur in only one Dutch judgment: opjuinen – 
aanzetten (case nr. 11), and this is probably not (part of) a pattern, but a sort of “register 
clash,” merely incidental. More interesting because of its potential for patterning are semantic 
oppositions which seem to be the exclusive province of English judgments: 
- “a public interest in disclosure greater than the private interest in secrecy” (18.),  
- “keener to conceal his own identity than discover theirs” (16.), 
but these double contrasts are not part of a pattern extending beyond the phrase. However, 
these lines from Lord Slynn’s speech on the joys of parenthood are: 
To reduce the costs by anything resembling a realistic or reliable figure for the benefit 
to the parents is well nigh impossible unless it is assumed that the benefit of a child 
must always outweigh the cost which, like many judges in the cases I have referred to, 
I am not prepared to assume. Of course there should be joy at the birth of a healthy 
child, at the baby's smile and the teenager's enthusiasms but how can these [be] put in 
money terms and trimmed to allow for sleepless nights and teenage disobedience? If 
the valuation is made early how can it be known whether the baby will grow up strong 
or weak, clever or stupid, successful or a failure both personally and careerwise, 
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honest or a crook? It is not impossible to make a stab at finding a figure for the 
benefits to reduce the costs of rearing a child but the difficulties of finding a reliable 
figure are sufficient to discourage the acceptance of this approach. (10.) 
The first series of words in italics, referring to advantages and disadvantages of having 
children, consist of implicit oppositions; the second series are explicit oppositions. But these 
are set in a framework of lexical repetition (assumed - assume), parallelism (how can…how 
can), metaphor (to make a stab at) and alliteration (resembling a realistic or reliable figure, 
finding a figure, reduce the costs of rearing a child, the acceptance of this approach). The 
final clause: “but the difficulties of finding a reliable figure…” combines elements of an 
earlier f-alliteration with a new element, reliable, which is part of the r-alliteration in the first 
sentence (“resembling a realistic or reliable figure”). The result is not only that reliable 
receives special emphasis, but also that the argumentation has come full circle. 
 
Table 5 
Contrast 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
contrasts between:                                        
simple and complex 
syntax   
        
  
        
  
words of Germanic and 
Latin derivation   1 1 
 
3 
   
1   2 
    
1 
  
  
formal and informal 
words   
      
1 
 
  
        
  
semantic oppositions                     2 3     6 5   3   
 
 Repetition is part and parcel of legal language. It comes in many shapes in judgments, 
for example in the elaborate formulas that are used in the summary of (older) judgments by 
the House of Lords:  
- “It is Ordered and Adjudged, by the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in the Court of 
Parliament of Her Majesty the Queen…”  
or in the grounds for cassation in (again, older) judgments by the Hoge Raad:  
- “te overwegen en te beslissen als daarin is beslist…”  
This sort of repetition is far removed from anything to do with literary language, and for this 
reason not included in the table. “Lexical repetition” only concerns repetitions that may be 
said to possess some sort of literary quality. Examples of these are mainly found in Dutch 
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judgments: gruwelijke en schokkende, oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid. Parallellism may also 
occur as a result from a legal requirement, e.g. the O. (Overwegende…) in Kelderluik (case nr. 
1a). In fact, this judgment is one long sentence made up of parallel constructions, every clause 
starting with dat and ending with a semicolon. Other, non-legal, parallel constructions can be 
found in both Dutch and English judgments: ook hier… ook hier…, voorzover... voorzover…, 
he was angry… he was angry…, certainly… certainly…, or with some variation, building up a 
climax:  
- “Some of the conversation recorded is personal. Some relates to the parties' 
business ventures. But much is devoted to discussing and working out the terms of 
the corrupt bargain…” (16.),  
or in combination with semantic oppositions: 
- “to exclude the uninvited, to include only the invited, to preclude unauthorized 
photography, to control the authorized photography” (18.). 
Truly literary forms of repetition are alliteration and end rhyme. Alliteration is prolific 
in English judgments, though there are also some Dutch examples: op suggestieve en 
sensationele wijze, bekendheid en belangstelling, een zekere zeggenschap. A few of the many 
English examples are at some stage, strongly supportive, commercial confidentiality of 
coverage, a paradigm private occasion, proof of proximity presents no problem, replete with 
references. English justices seem to have a preference for plosives: more than half of the 
alliterations I found were p- or k-alliterations. Some word pairs are (near) synonyms: close 
and careful scrutiny, others antonyms: on or off the pitch. End rhyme is, of course, the most 
poetic variety of repetition, which can be expressed in everyday language:  
- “the wear and tear on the mother...” (10.), 
or in an inspired utterance:  
- “the dazzling glare, too bright for the human eye to bear…” (14.).  
Taken out of its context, this could well have been a line from a love poem. The third instance 
of end rhyme: 
- “The ambush of the appellant at the airport may have been seen as oppressive, the 
weight of the newspaper's journalistic onslaught as excessive and the newspaper's 
attempt to involve the appellant's children as offensive” (16.), 
provides an example of three interacting forms of repetition: alliteration (“The ambush of the 
appellant at the airport”), parallelism (as… as… as…), and end rhyme (oppressive, excessive, 
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offensive). The pattern is also reinforced by “register borrowing” from military language such 
as ambush and onslaught. It is in examples like this that a glimpse of literariness is shining 
through. 
 
Table 6 
Repetition 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
lexical repetition 4 
  
1 1 
 
1 
  
  
  
1 
 
1 2 
  
  
parallellism   
 
1 
 
1 1 
   
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 3 
 
1 
alliteration   
      
3 2   2 10 6 1 3 8 4 5 6 
end rhyme                           1 1 1       
 
 
3.4: Polysemy: metaphor 
 
As said in 1.3, polysemy is the capacity of words to have more than one meaning. A 
polysemic (this is the adjective used by Carter and Nash, which is, according to the OED, the 
linguistic term; Peter Newmark uses polysemous) text can therefore be read in more ways 
than one. Consequently, polysemy seems incompatible with legal texts that aim (among other 
things) at conveying unambiguous information. However, there is one type of polysemy that 
may be admissible to legal language: metaphor. Metaphor allows words with specific 
meanings to take on new, related meanings. Thus denotations may be turned into 
connotations, words may be read figuratively rather than literally, and new meanings may 
point to something that is outside the text. There is a clear link between polysemy and 
metaphor in Newmark’s claim that “all polysemous words… are potentially metaphorical” 
(104). And there may even be a similar aesthetic purpose: Carter and Nash point out that 
polysemic words have the capacity to “provide a verbal pleasure” (41); according to 
Newmark, the pragmatic purpose of metaphor is “to appeal, to delight, to surprise” (104). 
Newmark distinguishes six types of metaphor, in increasing order of originality: dead, 
cliché, stock, adapted, recent, and original metaphors.  
1. Dead metaphors have become so common that they “pass unnoticed”. As their 
metaphorical qualities are simply overlooked, they have “ceased to be metaphorical” 
(Gray 175). As such, they have also given up any claim to literariness. Dead 
metaphors abound in the Dutch texts: in het midden laten, een (belangrijke) rol spelen, 
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aan het maatschappelijk verkeer deelnemen, voor rekening komen van, but also occur 
in the English ones: attach weight to (an argument), to take account of (the facts). I 
found one example that is found in both the Dutch and the English judgments: in the 
light of. Supreme Court justices seem to have a preference for this expression, because 
it occurs in seven of the nineteen judgments (even three times in case nr. 8). 
2. Cliché metaphors are “used as a substitute for clear thought” (Newmark 105), as an 
excuse for not having think about the facts of the matter. These metaphors often 
appear in appellative texts, such as political and commercial texts, but are not very 
likely to be found in legal texts, which should (preferably) be the result of clear 
thinking, phrased in clear wordings. There are no examples in the corpus. 
3. Stock (or standard) metaphors are established metaphors, well-used but “not deadened 
by overuse” (Newmark 108). This is the type of metaphor that is found in almost 
every text in the corpus (with the exception of one Dutch and one English case). It 
tends to occur more in Dutch than in English texts. In numbers, there are more English 
stock metaphors, but this is due to an overabundance of metaphor in two texts (nrs. 12 
and 18). Many Dutch examples are concerned with life, death, and health: in het leven 
roepen van (een gevaarlijke situatie), met zijn gezondheid sukkelen, mank gaan aan, 
aan de dood ontsnappen but there are also others: door de beugel kunnen (in a 
quotation), de vraag rijst, populariteit verzilveren. Examples of English stock 
metaphors are: to come to light, to make a stab at, and to throw his weight around. 
4. Adapted metaphors are stock metaphors with one or more elements adapted to the 
rhetorical situation. An example is found in case nr. 10: “they must look to their 
perspective and impalpable gains on the roundabouts to balance what they actually 
lose on the swings.” This is a well-known playground metaphor, with a semantic 
opposition, impalpable vs. actually, added (note that there is also a syntactic 
opposition between the first clause and the embedded second clause). 
In this category I would include legal metaphors: fixed expressions in legal language 
that make use of metaphor. Again, these are found in both languages. Some Dutch 
examples are on the verge of becoming dead metaphors: afwegen van belangen, 
afbakenen van de gevallen, others are almost exclusively found in legal language: dit 
klemt temeer, (naar de eis der wet) met redenen omkleed, zich keren tegen 
(verwerping van het betoog). English examples of the latter type are: to sound in 
damages, findings of fact.  
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5. Recent metaphors are neologisms of recent coinage, which have been adopted in the 
general language. They could not be traced in these, first and foremost legal, texts. 
6. Original (or novel) metaphors are artistic products, most likely to be found in 
expressive texts. The problem with this type of metaphor is that “original” is a 
subjective notion, depending on the reader’s opinion and experience. Examples should 
therefore be given with some caution, but there might well be one in case nr. 18: 
“[this] case does not get off the ground”. 
Metaphors may consist of one word or more. In the latter case they are often called 
“extended” metaphors, though there is no agreement on the minimum number of words or 
sentences that make up an extended metaphor. A given metaphor may also be repeated or 
developed within a paragraph or a text. This kind of extended metaphor comes close to the 
notion of literariness, as it allows patterns to come into being. I found examples in English 
judgments only. In case nr. 4, Lord Wilberforce plays with the images of unwanted things that 
all appear in large numbers: “a proliferation of claims” (proliferation often being associated 
with nuclear weapons), “the establishment of an industry of lawyers and psychiatrists”, and “a 
flood of litigation”. He also uses metaphor to develop an image of borders: “the law is to draw 
an arbitrary line”. This line is at first not precisely defined: “he has crossed some critical line 
behind which he ought to stop”, but develops into “the barrier of commercial sense and 
practical convenience”. Finally, now that the line is known, “the law should retreat behind the 
lines” (like an army). Lord Hoffmann (case nr. 18) criticises the attitude of a magazine that 
bought and published photographs which had surreptitiously been taken: “these defendants 
firmly kept their eyes shut lest they might see…” and informs his audience that they had better 
keep their (metaphorical) eyes open instead: “The point of which one should never lose sight 
is…” that it was all about money: “if one keeps one's eye firmly on the money…” (the 
repetition of firmly reinforces the pattern).  
There is a striking amount of military metaphor in the English cases in the corpus. 
Examples are case nr. 4 (proliferation and retreat behind the lines, as discussed above), nr. 18 
(“Thorpe infiltrated the wedding and took photographs”), and especially case nr. 16. Not only 
does Lord Justice Palmer of the Court of Appeal report the events in war-like terms 
(“bombarded him with questions”), this language has been adopted by Lord Bingham of the 
House of Lords as well, in a story that sometimes almost reads like a detective: “The 
newspaper armed Mr Vincent with equipment…” In “a posse of journalists” there is a clear 
reference to “The population of local able-bodied men whom a sheriff may summon to … 
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pursue felons” (OED, s.v. “posse”). These “able-bodied men” participate in an “ambush of the 
appellant at the airport” and a “journalistic onslaught” (see also 3.3). But the appellant is not 
only the victim of all kinds of military operations, he himself, a former goalkeeper, is accused 
of having acted in a way that could “undermine the integrity of a game which earns the 
loyalty and support of millions”.  
Metaphor is the most frequent form of polysemy, but it is not the only one. Metonymy, 
synecdoche, irony, hyperbole and understatement are also examples of figures of speech that 
could be read in more ways than one. However, they do not appear in these texts, even though 
some (e.g. puns or understatement) may be said to be typical of the English – and, by 
extension, of English discourse. 
Table 7 
Metaphor 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
dead metaphor 3 2 1     1     1       1     1 1     
stock metaphor 1 2 3 5 1 2 4 2 1   4 2 
 
3 7 8 1 15 10 
legal metaphor 1 1 2 1 
    
1   
      
2 
 
  
extended metaphor                       2       1 1 2 1 
 
 
3.5: Displaced Interaction and Speech Acts 
 
Displaced interaction, which is related not only to literature but also to fiction, enables the 
reader to enter into what Coleridge called “a willing suspension of disbelief”: a temporary 
state of mind in which a reader is willing to assume that what he or she reads is plausible, and 
does not critically judge the narrative by its truthfulness. This means that the reader will not 
be asked to perform any particular action, except “that of a kind of mental accompaniment to 
the text in the course of which he or she interprets or negotiates what the message means” 
(Carter and Nash 42). Interpretation is different for every reader and may for one specific 
reader even vary with every next reading of the text. This is inconsistent with the nature of a 
judgment in cassation, which should be clear and unambiguous, and indeed the Dutch 
Supreme Court judgments in the corpus do not leave the reader any room for interpretation or 
negotiation. This applies not only to Kelderluik (see the example in 1.4), but also to more 
recent judgments. The facts in Nijmeegse Markt (2016) are drily summed up: 
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Op 3 januari 2009 is [eiseres] op de stoep van de Burchtstraat in Nijmegen ten val 
gekomen doordat zij is gestruikeld over een of meer stroomkabels. Deze kabels, 
eigendom van marktkraamhouders, liepen van een elektriciteitskast, eigendom van de 
Gemeente, aan de gevelzijde van de stoep van de Burchtstraat naar de marktkramen 
aan de andere zijde van die stoep. Als gevolg van de val heeft [eiseres] letsel 
opgelopen aan haar knieën. (1b.) 
In terms of speech act theory, this little “story” can be interpreted in only one way, for 
all readers and for all times. It is a meaningful utterance, because the reader knows what the 
words mean (locution). The nature of the utterance is a description of a specific event 
(illocution). The aim of the utterance is to inform the reader of this event (perlocution). There 
is no interaction between author and reader: the court sums up the facts and the reader can 
only follow. In addition, the numerous references to legislation in other parts of this judgment 
state clearly that this is an authoritative text, written by legal experts. 
 English Supreme Court justices are, of course, legal experts too. But they are also 
authors of a personal opinion, and some of these authors seem to allow their readers some 
room for interpretation (e.g. Lord Atkin in 1.4). It should also be taken into account that, 
contrary to Dutch Supreme Court judgments that are nowadays nearly always only published 
in writing, UK Supreme Court judgments are not only published, but also pronounced orally. 
This difference in rhetorical situation may partly determine the interaction between the author 
and the audience. For example, in case nr. 2, Lord Reid directly addresses his colleagues in 
court (“My Lords”), but draws his audience in as well, not only trying to persuade, but also 
constantly inviting them to negotiate what the message means. When he says “there can be no 
question of padding lamp posts," he performs a speech act with a number of illocutionary and 
perlocutionary possibilities. The nature of the utterance (illocution) may be a warning, an 
explanation or even a command. As a result, the effect on the hearer (perlocution) will also 
differ. Some, and indeed most, will simply agree or disagree, with or without asking 
themselves why they feel this way. Lawyers will ask themselves how far the law should go to 
protect infirm pedestrians. Non-professionals may wonder what this statement means for the 
safety of the blind, and there may even be some who start imagining a world where lamp 
posts and other dangerous objects have been neutralised – or manipulated, so that they have 
become a threat to everyone who ventures on the streets. The point is that there is room for 
reader (or hearer) interpretation, and that interpretation may vary. 
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3.6: Discourse Patterning 
 
Patterns at the level of discourse, made up of lexical or syntactical repetition, may be an 
indication of a degree of literariness in a text, provided that these patterns are not a result  of 
the formal requirements of this text. For a pattern to be truly ‘literary’, repetition should 
represent and reinforce content, so that the reader is engaged in a process of organical growth, 
or, as Carter and Nash phrase it, an “unfolding ‘plot’” (45). Although Kelderluik  is 
syntactically highly patterned, with four sentences starting with O. (Overwegende), and a 
subdivision of these sentences in clauses starting with dat, this is only part of the typical 
layout of a Dutch Supreme Court judgment of the 1960s. However, there is another form of 
repetition in this judgment, i.e. repetition of word pairs with related meanings, occurring 
throughout the text: onoplettendheid en zorgeloosheid, roekeloos en onvoorzichtig, and 
oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid. These are complementary elements in a semantic pattern, 
which forms an A-B-A structure in the text. Starting with the first two (negative) pairs in the 
first part of the text, the middle section explores what happens if the requirements of 
oplettendheid en voorzichtigheid (positive) are or are not met, growing into the conclusion 
that there has indeed been a certain amount of onoplettendheid (negative) on the part of the 
victim of the accident. That there is only one focal noun in this final sentence results from a 
reinforcement of meaning: the reader has been led to a definite conclusion that need not be 
expressed in more than one word. 
Most suprasentential patterns consist of lexical items that belong to the same category, 
e.g. the adjectives gruwelijk, schokkend, traumatiserend, afschuwelijk in Taxibus.  Groups of 
lexical items are also found in Renteneurose, where a pattern of triplets with related meanings 
can be traced, from the health problems (hoofdpijnen, geheugenstoornis en algehele 
achteruitgang van zijn intellectuele capaciteiten) to the diagnosis (renteneurose, aggravatie 
en querulerende gedragingen), or the lichamelijke, geestelijke of psychische constitution of 
the appellant, which may be due either to opzettelijk, doelbewust resp. verwijtbaar behaviour 
or to geaardheid, aanleg of instelling.  
Other patterns, involving repetition of identical lexical items, can be discerned in case 
nr. 16:  
- “In thus seeking to explain away his apparently incriminating statements, the 
appellant faced certain formidable difficulties. Most formidable of all is the 
content of the tapes themselves…”  
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In this pattern, formidable provides the link in what indeed can be called an unfolding ‘plot,’ 
including an element of suspense and an antithesis between a rather undetermined certain and 
a very definite most. This pattern is repeated in the course of the text: “his difficulties do not 
end … his difficulties do not even end there,” and “But for one feature of the jury's decision 
… That feature is…” 
A higher degree of literariness can be awarded to a text in which two or more patterns 
interact. This is what happens in case nr. 4, with its play on two ideas: that of a road that is 
being travelled, and that of places where the traveller cannot go. The reader is taken on a 
metaphorical journey “from case to case, upon a basis of logical necessity,” and with every 
new case the reader is invited to ponder: “if a mother… if a father… if a wife and mother…” 
The “process of logical progression” (note the alliteration) seems to go on endlessly, for good 
reasons: “To argue from one factual situation to another and to decide by analogy is a natural 
tendency of the human and the legal mind”, but here it stops short. Where at first there only 
had been “an arbitrary line”, in drawing too much on analogy “some critical line” has been 
crossed. In the next section that line is defined: it is “the barrier of commercial sense and 
practical convenience”. Both images interact, and both are worded in metaphorical language 
(see also the discussion of this case in 3.4), so that a higher degree of semantic density is 
achieved and reading at more than one level is possible. This may be called characteristic of 
texts higher up on the cline of literariness: there is interaction not only between patterns, but 
also between two or more of the criteria defined by Carter and Nash. 
 
Table 8  
Discourse Patterning 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
lexical patterns                               1       
semantic patterns 1 1     1             2               
 
 
3.7: Obiter dicta 
 
Finally, I looked for obiter dicta in this corpus. These are defined as remarks that refer to 
possible future events, to “what might be”. As they are made “along the way” (see also 1.5), 
they are not binding on lower courts. Obiter dicta occur both in English personal opinions and 
in Dutch joint productions: I found three instances on either side. The fact that they are not 
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part of the ratio decidendi should allow them to be expressed in a less formal, and maybe 
even more philosophical, language. However, this is not the case for the six examples in this 
corpus: there is no substantial difference in style or register between the part that could be 
characterised as being obiter and the other parts of the judgment.  
The Dutch Supreme Court uses obiter dicta to deal with questions that are not directly 
involved in the case at hand:  
- “Met betrekking tot deze in dit geding door partijen niet in hun debat betrokken 
vraag volstaat de Hoge Raad daarom vooralsnog met het volgende…” (9.), 
or with considerations that are outside the scope of the judiciary, but nevertheless merit some 
contemplation. I found two examples of the latter in Taxibus:  
- “Andere vormen van compensatie en erkenning van leed dan toekenning van een 
bedrag aan smartengeld zijn denkbaar…” (3.). 
However, this is not for the judge to decide, as he is not allowed to deviate from the statutory 
system. The same goes for the second obiter:  
- “Niet uitgesloten is dat het wettelijk stelsel onvoldoende tegemoet komt aan de 
maatschappelijk gevoelde behoefte om aan degenen die in hun leven de ernstige 
gevolgen moeten ondervinden van het overlijden van een persoon tot wie zij … in 
een affectieve relatie hebben gestaan, enige vorm van genoegdoening te 
verschaffen” (3.). 
The reader seems to have some room for interpretation here, but there is no other evidence for 
literariness in these two obiter dicta. The language is similar to that of the rest of the 
judgment and shares some typical features with that of other Dutch Supreme Court judgments 
(e.g. double negation: niet uitgesloten, see 1.5). 
The same can be said of the three English examples. Yet these are remarkable, albeit 
not for linguistic reasons. In 1965, Judge Buckley raised “the possibility that ability to receive 
television signals free from interference might one day be recognised as ‘so important a part 
of an ordinary householder's enjoyment of his property that such interference should be 
regarded as a legal nuisance’”. Exactly this question was dealt with twelve years later (case 
nr. 14). Because of their philosophic nature, obiter dicta may be prolific in areas of law that 
are still developing. I found two examples in the Dutch nervous shock case (Taxibus, see 
above), and two in its English counterpart (McLoughlin v O’Brian). Lord Wilberforce 
acknowledges           
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- “that it should follow that other cases involving less close relationships must be 
very carefully scrutinised. I cannot say that they should never be admitted” (4.), 
and even prophesies that the current scope (the shock “must come through sight or hearing of 
the event or of its immediate aftermath”) may be extended in the future:  
- “Whether some equivalent of sight or hearing, e.g. through simultaneous 
television, would suffice may have to be considered” (4.). 
It was considered eight years later, in Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police, 
where it was held that parents and spouses who had seen the disaster at Hillsborough football 
stadium by viewing a live television broadcast could not recover damages for nervous shock. 
 
 Table 9  
Obiter dicta 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
Obiter dicta       1 2             2   1           
 
 
3.8: Overall results 
 
Within the restrictions of this research I can present only a limited number of findings.  
Nevertheless, some clear results emerge from the analysis of the corpus of Dutch and English 
Supreme Court judgments. Both are, to a certain extent, medium dependent. Dutch judgments 
rely on legal terminology and abbreviations, whereas English judgments require a knowledge 
of Latin. There is a clear tendency towards less abbreviations: Kelderluik has an exceptionally 
high number of different abbreviations (ten), later judgments seldom use more than two. On 
the other hand, legal Latin is present in every one of the nine English judgments. 
 
 Re-registration is mainly found in the English judgments, though some words or 
expressions from a more colloquial register appear in Dutch judgments. 
 
With regard to interaction of levels, there is no evidence of syntactic contrast, though 
facts are usually described in short and simple sentences and the grounds of the judgments are 
often worded in long complex sentences. Contrast is therefore only found in lexis, with an 
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apparent preference for semantic oppositions in the English judgments. Patterns of repetition 
are also more frequent in English judgments, and they interact with other patterns more often. 
 
 Metaphor is found in all judgments but one (the most recent Dutch judgment). Dutch 
authors frequently use dead or legal metaphors, while English authors seem to prefer stock 
metaphors. Extended metaphor only occurs in English judgments, the majority (five out of 
seven) dating from the twenty-first century.  
 
Displaced interaction has not been expressed in a table because of the large differences 
between the Dutch and the English Supreme Court. Owing to requirements of form that are 
typical of judgments in cassation and to the fact that they are authoritative texts, lacking any 
form of interaction between author and reader, Dutch judgments can make no claim to 
literariness whatsoever in this area. English judgments are more open to interpretation, 
because they are written by individual justices (as opposed to the Dutch co-production), who 
pronounce them in public (which nowadays hardly ever occurs in the Netherlands). 
 
 Discourse patterning should represent content, not form. Syntactical patterns found in 
this corpus are always the result of formal requirements. Lexical or semantic patterns do 
occur, but they are relatively rare and only found in judgments from the twentieth century.  
 
Finally, the language in obiter dicta is in line with the rest of the judgments, and not 
significantly more philosophical or literary. 
 
Medium dependence may be called a “negative” criterion: a text that is more medium 
dependent is less likely to be literary. “Positive” criteria (re-registration, interaction of levels, 
polysemy and discourse patterning) have a linear relationship with literariness: the higher the 
number of occurrences in a text, the more the text moves up the cline of literariness. The 
overall scores (including totals) for these criteria are shown in table 10. 
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Table 10  
Scores on the four “positive” criteria (including totals) 
 
case nr. 1a 7 5 9 3 13 15 11 17 1b 2 4 6 14 10 16 8 18 12 
year 65 85 94 97 02 05 06 07 13 16 65 83 96 97 99 02 04 07 16 
the text is clearly 
meant to be spoken: 
use of the first person 
singular, address to 
an audience                     1 1   1   2   3 1 
inviting the audience 
to think along the 
speaker's line 
         
  2 3 
  
1 
  
3   
giving a personal (but 
not a legal) opinion 
or interpretation 
         
  1 5 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 
using striking words 
or expressions 
 
1 
    
2 1 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 1 1 
  
  
referring to common 
knowledge or opinion 
  
2 
      
  2 1 
 
2 1 1 1 1   
non-legal quotation 
         
  
        
1 
create suspense 
         
  1 
    
4 
  
  
lively description of a 
situation                       1         1     1 
contrasts between:                                        
words of Germanic 
and Latin derivation   1 1 
 
3 
   
1   2 
    
1 
  
  
formal and informal 
words   
      
1 
 
  
        
  
semantic oppositions                     2 3     6 5   3   
repetition:                                       
lexical repetition 4 
  
1 1 
 
1 
  
  
  
1 
 
1 2 
  
  
parallellism   
 
1 
 
1 1 
   
3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
2 3 
 
1 
alliteration   
      
3 2   2 10 5 1 3 8 4 5 6 
end rhyme                           1 1 1       
dead metaphor 3 2 1 
  
1 
  
1   
  
1 
  
1 1 
 
  
stock metaphor 1 2 3 5 1 2 4 2 1   4 2 
 
3 7 8 1 15 10 
legal metaphor 1 1 2 1 
    
1   
      
2 
 
  
extended metaphor                       2       1 1 2 1 
lexical discourse 
patterning                               1       
semantic discourse 
patterning 1 1     1             2               
TOTAL 10 8 10 7 7 4 7 7 6 4 18 32 8 11 22 41 14 34 22 
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Two points need emphasising here. In the first place, some parts of a text fit into more 
than one category (as shown in the analysis). It may seem unfair to score them in all 
applicable categories. However, literariness is about interacting patterns or criteria. Patterns 
that place a text further up the cline of literariness should, in my opinion, for that very reason 
be entitled to a higher score. In the second place, I feel that there is some justification for 
drawing conclusions from these scores. Though it has rightfully been said that “whether a text 
is considered to be literary is unlikely to derive simply from the presence of more or fewer 
literary features” (Yau-hau Tse 240), the result may at least tell us something about the 
likelihood of a text being more or less literary. As will be seen in the conclusion, it is no 
coincidence that the texts that merited special mention in the previous sections because of 
their literary qualities are also the ones with the highest scores, and that the English cases 
have significantly higher scores than their Dutch counterparts. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
My analysis of a corpus of ten Dutch and nine English Supreme Court judgments yielded 
some very fine examples of literary language in legal decisions. However, I had to dig deep to 
locate these, and adapt my working method in the process. Having found that, when 
interpreted in a narrow sense, some of the criteria for literariness proposed by Carter and Nash 
are hardly applicable to legal texts, I decided to give these criteria a broader interpretation. 
Thus the central question for establishing medium dependence became: “What would a non-
legal reader need to gain knowledge of this legal text?” I found that each medium served one 
group of readers only: a list of legal abbreviations and a legal dictionary were indispensable to 
Dutch non-professionals, while the English could not do without a Latin dictionary. The 
addition of two “fiction games” to the criterion of re-registration did not yield many results: in 
almost all cases in which the facts seemed to tell a story, this story could not be regarded as 
fiction. The only exception was the most recent English case (nr. 12), in which the use of 
verbs, adjectives and participle clauses hinted at something that may (with some analogy) be 
called “fictitiousness”. The criterion of displaced interaction seemed hardly applicable, even if 
linked to the speech act theory. Owing to the nature of cassation, Dutch Supreme Court 
judgments can be interpreted in only one way, which excludes any form of interaction 
between writer and reader. English judgments leave more room for interpretation, though not 
ample. Because of this, I left displaced interaction out in my final assessment. 
Semantic density as defined by Carter and Nash is hard to pinpoint in legal texts. As it 
is primarily about contrast and repetition, I narrowed my analysis down to these two features. 
Contrast is rare in Dutch judgments, and even rarer in the more recent ones; repetition occurs 
more often, though not as often as in the English judgments with their large numbers of 
alliterations, distributed throughout all cases. Here I also found the interaction between forms 
of repetition that makes a text more literary. However, true literariness shows when the 
criteria themselves are interacting. I found links between the two criteria which are concerned 
with patterns, each at their own level: semantic density and discourse patterning. In two older 
Dutch cases (1a and 7), a semantic pattern of similar lexical items was part of a pattern on 
discourse level. In one English case (nr. 16), repetition of identical lexical items was made an 
integral part of the text. Other English cases (4, 10 and 16 again), combined semantic and 
discourse patterning with metaphor (polysemy), which placed them even higher up the cline 
of literariness. 
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Metaphor, the most common manifestation of polysemy, was found in almost all 
judgments. Overall, the number of metaphor in Dutch cases tends to decline over the years, 
whereas there is an increase of metaphor in English cases in the twenty-first century. Stock 
metaphors abound in both languages, dead and legal metaphors are rare in English judgments. 
Besides, there are no Dutch examples of extended metaphor. This type of metaphor, which 
allows patterns to come into being and is therefore of a higher degree of literariness, is mostly 
found in recent English judgments. One of the most striking findings in my analysis of 
metaphor was the presence of military metaphor in several English judgments (4, 16 and 18).  
The obiter dicta in the corpus were not what I expected them to be. Not only were they 
few in number, but I also found that they were not more philosophical or literary than the 
other parts of the judgments. Their significance is therefore mainly legal or historical: some 
raised interesting issues for future legal debate, others made a prediction with an uncanny 
accuracy. 
The most problematic factor in the discussion of literariness was (and is) the difference 
in the legal systems of England and the Netherlands. This difference accounts for some of the 
results, but not for everything. It is clear that a Dutch Supreme Court judgment is much more 
restricted in the use of other registers, not only because it expresses a shared opinion, but also 
because it is a written statement. Addresses to an audience and invitations to think along with 
the author may be related to the circumstance that English judgments are also spoken out in 
public, and personal opinions are, of course, more likely to be expressed by an individual 
author than by a collective authorship. But even a group of authors could tell a story or give a 
lively description of a situation or an event, and there certainly is no ban on including a well-
chosen metaphor or citing an appropriate (non-legal) quotation. As the instrument of cassation 
is only concerned with the rule of law, the Hoge Raad is not supposed to judge on facts 
(history, what was), and one would therefore expect their judgments to be on a more 
philosophical level. However, the Dutch Supreme Court seems to be moving in the opposite 
direction: the analysis shows that there is a tendency towards factual reporting in their 
judgments, and that consequently their language is becoming more and more restricted. 
Overall, my conclusion is that English Supreme Court judgments are indeed more 
“literary” than their Dutch counterparts. Not only did I find more instances of the Carter and 
Nash criteria in English judgments, but they were also more often of a higher literary nature 
(e.g. end rhyme and extended metaphor), and interacted more often and to a greater extent 
with other elements, within a given criterion or in a pattern with one or more other criteria. 
There is also a clear difference between the judgments from the twentieth century and the 
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more recent ones, with opposite results. On the one hand, the Dutch judgments tend to 
become less medium dependent, but also more factual and less literary. The language of the 
most recent judgment (Nijmeegse Markt 2016) is sparse and almost without a hint of literary 
features: the observation that this is the only judgment in the corpus without metaphor was 
indeed telling. On the other hand, the more recent English judgments seem to be gaining in 
literary qualities. Poetical forms of repetition and metaphor have become regular features 
from the turn of the century, and justices seem more willing to allow other genres to be part of 
their speeches. Here too, the most recent judgment (Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets 
Plc. 2016) serves as an example, with its action-packed and emotionally appealing description 
of events. 
Limited as this research may be, I feel that it has opened up many areas for further 
investigation. The question whether the language of dissenting opinions of English justices, a 
large category of obiter dicta which was not included in this corpus, differs from that of the 
leading speech might be an interesting one. Another question might be if there is any 
difference in literariness between judgments written by male justices and those written by 
their female colleagues. Research should then be done at the lower courts, as Lady Hale (who 
contributed two quotations to this thesis, and whose opinions are certainly worth reading) is, 
so far, the only woman to have ever been appointed to the highest level of the judiciary. And 
there are, of course, numerous possibilities for further excursions into the world of metaphor 
in legal language, even if research were to be restricted to a specific type or topic. For 
example, the presence of military metaphor, mentioned above as one of the most salient 
results of my research, could be further investigated. One may ask if military metaphor is 
characteristic of English judgments only, of older or more recent judgments, or, linking the 
question to gender, if this is a typical feature of male speech, and if so, if there are more of 
these features, and so on and so forth. The possibilities are endless – and exciting. 
My final recommendation is not for scholars, but for lawyers, especially for those who 
acknowledge the value of literature for legal professionals and aspire to be a judge (or even a 
justice) one day. Many legal professionals feel that judges should only be concerned with the 
law, but this does not mean that the language in which the law is expressed needs to be devoid 
of any personal, literary touch. Literary language may be an invaluable help in reaching out 
beyond the wall of legal language and connecting with those on the outside. East and west 
may be far apart, but once a move has been made, there will be, somewhere in between, a 
place to meet.  
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Appendix A: List of judgments 
 
Kelderluik, HR 05-11-1965, ECLI:NL:HR:1965:AB7079 
Meppelse Ree, HR 11-11-1983, ECLI:NL:HR:1983:AG4688 * 
Renteneurose, HR 08-02-1985, ECLI:NL:HR:1985:AG4961 
Taxusstruik, HR 22-04-1994, ECLI:NL:HR:1994:ZC1347 
Wrongful Birth, HR 21-02-1997, ECLI:NL:HR:1997:ZC2286 
Taxibus, HR 22-02-2002, ECLI:NL:HR:2002:AD5356 
Burengeschil, HR 21-10-2005, ECLI:NL:HR:2005:AT8823 
Sanoma v Boerhaave, HR 12-05-2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV3385 
Kievitsdal, HR 09-11-2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA7557 
Cruijff v Tirion Uitgevers, HR 14-06-2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:CA2788 
Nijmeegse Markt, HR 07-10-2016, ECLI:NL:HR:2016:2283 
 
 
Gorris v Scott [1874] LR 9 Exch 125 * 
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 * 
Haley v London Electricity Board [1965] AC 778 
McLoughlin v O’Brian [1983] AC 410 
Alcock v Chief Constable of the South Yorkshire Police [1992] AC 310 * 
Page v Smith [1996] 1 AC 155 
Hunter v Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] AC 655 
McFarlane v Tayside Health Board [1999] UKHL 50 
Grobbelaar v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2002] UKHL 40 
Simons v British Steel [2004] UKHL 20 
Douglas v Hello! Ltd. [2007] UKHL 21 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets plc. [2016] UKSC 11 
 
 
 
(*)Not included in the corpus for analysis. 
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Appendix B: Sources of quotations 
 
“… and never the twain shall meet.” Rudyard Kipling. “The Ballad of East and West.” 1892. 
In Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 465. 
 
1.1 “Read the literature of human nature. The lawyers can gain many points by reading.” 
From an address by Frank J. Loesch, President of the Chicago Bar Association, at 
Northwestern University Law School, 1905. Quoted in Wigmore, John H. “A List of One 
Hundred Legal Novels.” Illinois Law Review vol. 17, 1922-1923, p. 32. 
 
1.2 “I cannot conceive how any ordinary person can be expected to understand it.” Lord 
Denning, commenting on Davy v Leeds Corporation, 1964. Quoted in Crystal, David. The 
Cambridge Encyclopedia of the English Language. 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003, p. 376. 
 
1.3 “It is the impossibility of defining it in any simple way that is its most defining feature.” 
Katie Wales. A Dictionary of Stylistics. 3rd ed., Harlow: Longman, 1994, p. 280. 
 
1.4 “It is quite difficult to measure which text is more literary unless the two texts are of 
identical genre.” Andrew Yau-hau Tse. “Which One is More Literary – A Speech or a 
Visitor’s Guide?” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science vol. 1, no. 5, May 
2011, p. 237. 
 
1.5 “Cassatie is een Franse uitvinding … Het idee had exportwaarde en werd gecopieerd in 
Spanje, Griekenland, Portugal, Italië, België, Nederland – en Vietnam.” Marc Loth and 
Marijke Kooijman. In Graaff, Ruben de, et al., editors. Rechtsvorming door de Hoge Raad. 
Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri, 2016, p. 258. 
 
1.6 “[T]his is an area of the law in which, as Lord Nicholls said, imprecision is inevitable. To 
search for certainty and precision … is to undertake a quest for a chimaera.” Lord Dyson in 
Mohamud v WM Morrison Supermarkets, [2016] UKSC 11, 54. 
 
2.1 “You know my methods. Apply them.” Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. The Sign of Four. 1890. 
In Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 292. 
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2.2 “There would be much to be said for our adopting the practice of other supreme courts in 
having a single majority opinion to which all have contributed and all can subscribe without 
further qualification or explanation. There would be less grist to the advocates' and academics' 
mills, but future litigants might thank us for that.” Lady Hale in Douglas v Hello! Ltd., [2007] 
UKHL 21, 303. 
 
3.2 “Out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing [can] ever [be] made.” 
Immanuel Kant. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlichten Absicht. 1784. In 
Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 453. (See 
also Nieuwenhuis, Hans. Orestes in Veghel: Recht, literatuur, civilisatie. Amsterdam: Balans, 
2004, p.7: “Recht en literatuur schaven ‘het kromme hout waaruit de mens gemaakt is.’”) 
 
3.5 “[a] willing suspension of disbelief.” Samuel Taylor Coleridge. Biographia Literaria. 
1817. In Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. 7th ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009,   
p. 241. (Also quoted in Nieuwenhuis, Hans. Kant & Co: Literatuur als spiegel van het recht. 
Amsterdam: Balans, 2011, p. 156.) 
 
 
